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ABSTRACT 
The study of foreign entry mode choice has proliferated in international 
business and strategic management. Over the last decade or so, the studies on foreign 
entry mode choice have been based almost exclusively on economic-driven theories 
such as the transaction cost theory, which focus mainly on the impacts of firm- and 
industry-specific factors on the entry mode choice, taking the effects of country-
specific contextual factors as constant or less important. However, it is suggested that 
in order to present a comprehensive picture of the modern world of organizations, 
existing economic framework needs inout from the institutional theories. The primary 
goal of the present study is to investigate the choice of foreign entry mode from the 
lens ofboth institutional perspective and transaction cost perspective. 
The present study shed new lights on the research stream of foreign entry mode 
choice in three ways. First, theoretically, this study is the first in the area of foreign 
entry mode choice research that adopts institutional perspective as the theoretical 
basis. The results of our analysis generally support that both institutional factors and 
transaction cost factors are significant determinants of foreign entry mode choice. 
Specifically, our findings suggest that 1) Among the institutional factors, regulative 
forces are more powerM than normative, cognitive, and historical forces in shaping the 
choice of foreign entry mode 2) The impacts of transaction cost factors are rather 
unstable across countries and industries 3) Foreign entry mode choice decision cannot 
be e?qplained by monoparadigm but by a pluralistic view such as the combination of 
institutional perspective and transaction cost economics, as in the present study. 
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Second, the present study is the first in the stream of foreign entry mode choice 
research that explores possible dimensions of country-specific institutional factors 
through exploratory factor analysis. Four dimensions are found in the present study. 
They are infrastructure restrictiveness, government restrictiveness, ownership 
rsestrictiveness, and ethnic restrictiveness. This study also created the most 
sophisticated and updated database of country-, industry-, parent-, and subsidiary-
specific variables, the richness of which may provide significant contribution to the 
field of foreign entry mode choice research. 
Third, this study offers implications to MNEs' managers that the choice of 
foreign entry mode is not merely a choice of ownership structure but also the choice of 
the degree of efficiency and legitimacy the MNEs should get from the investment. We 
propose that the extent to which an MNE should conform to the host country 
environment and its own efficiency strategic objective will be contingent upon its 
repository of knowledge and experience. 
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The study of foreign entry mode choice has proliferated in international 
business and strategic management research. Over the last decade or so, studies on 
foreign entry mode choice have been based almost exclusively on economic theories. 
Strategic behavior theories such as industrial organization economics and oligopoly 
economics, transaction cost theory, eclectic paradigm, and resource dependence theory 
all focuse on explaining how firms select entry modes in order to enhance their 
competitiveness, efficiency, and control over critical resources respectively. Yet, in a 
world of frequent and unpredictable technological and political changes, economic 
forces may not necessarily ensure an optimal growth path and a Pareto optimal 
allocation of resources of a firm (Dunning, 1995). Further, with the industrial powers 
emerging from East Asia approaching the market-based capitalism both at a socio-
institutional and a techno-economic level (Freeman & Perez, 1988), arguments based 
solely on economic forces may be less relevant in accounting for the behavior of the 
economic actors in this area. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also proposed that "to 
present a fully adequate picture of the modern world of organizations ... it [the 
economic model] must be supplemented by an institutional view". Initiated by this, the 
primary goal of the present study is to examine the influence of both the economic 
transaction cost factors and institutional factors (host country specific environmental 
factors) on foreign entry mode choice (the choice between a wholly-owned subsidiary 
and a joint venture). 
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Purposes of the Study 
The present study has three purposes. The first purpose of the study is to shed 
new light in the field of foreign entry mode choice by looking the field from the lens of 
institutional perspective. Transcending across national boarders, multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) are bounded by the institutional environments of the host 
countries. The choice of foreign entry mode, therefore, is expected to be subject to the 
influence of political, legal, economic, and socio-cultural elements in the host country. 
However, past studies which have examined the influence of country-specific factors 
on foreign entry mode choice are rather limited in scope (with a few number of host 
country factors such as local government restrictions, market potential, cultural 
distance, etc.) and without a strong theoretical base. Hence, the present study aims to 
devise a comprehensive theoretical base and a wider scope on the influence of country-
specific institutional factors on the choice of foreign entry mode. 
The second purpose of the study is to re-examine the effectiveness of 
transaction cost theory in explaining factors affecting foreign entry mode choice. 
Transaction cost theory has been the dominant theoretical paradigm in tlie stream of 
foreign entry mode choice studies. However, most of the existing empirical studies 
have tested the theory by either using the sample of US subsidiaries overseas or the 
non-US subsidiaries invested in the US. This study attempts to test whether transaction 
cost theory can explain foreign entry mode choice when a different sample (the 
Japanese multinationals across the world) is used. 
The third purpose of this study is to present a conceptual framework which 
combines the institutional forces and economic forces underlying foreign entry mode 
choice. The conceptual framework integrates the institutional perspective into the 
dominant economic paradigm on foreign entry mode research, that is, the transaction 
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cost theory. The transaction cost theory suggests that firms' actions are independent of 
external environmental forces. The institutional perspective, on the other hand, 
suggests firms under different institutional contexts may face different driving and 
restraining forces for their choices. While the transaction cost theory strives for 
efficiency, the institutional perspective strives for legitimacy. So, this study aims to 
explore how the two perspectives, when combining together, influence the latitude of 
jfirms in choosing the mode of entry. 
The final purpose of the study is to create a comprehensive and updated 
database. The present study attempts to conduct a large-scale study, using a sample of 
the subsidiaries invested in over fifty countries by large Japanese automobile and home 
electronics companies. Also, this study aims to explore a comprehensive set of 
country-specific factors which can indicate the political, legal, economic, and socio-
cultural aspects of the host countries. Besides, the current study aims to form a 
comprehensive database by combining country-specific, industry-specific, parent 
company, and subsidiary information together. Finally, the present study employs the 
most updated databases with information as of 1995 and 1996. By forming a more 
comprehensive database, it is hoped that the results of this study can provide a more 
up-to-date evidence to both academics and practitioners. 
The purposes of the present study are summarized in Table 1.1. 
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TABLE 1.1 
PURPOSES OF STUDY 
Existing studies: 
Purpose Dominant research stream Present study 
Theoretical Transaction cost theory Both economic forces (transaction cost 
perspectives used theory) and institutional forces 
Relationships to be The relationship between The relationship between institutional 
examined transaction cost factors and the factors and entry mode choice, the 
choice of foreign entry mode relationship between transaction cost 
factors and entry mode choice, and the 
joint impact of institutional and 
transaction cost factors on foreign entry 
mode choice 
Country-specific Local ownership restrictions, Explore a comprehensive set of country-
factors used cultural distance，and market specific factors indicating the political, 
potential legal, economic, and socio-cultural 
aspects of the host countries 
Samples Either the US overseas subsidiaries Japanese subsidiaries invested across 
in non-US countries or the non-US over fifty countries 
overseas subsidiaries in the US 
Scope of the Study 
To exclude any alternative explanations, the scope of the study is controlled 
as follows: 
Foreign Entry Mode 
The present study focuses exclusively on those investment-based modes, 
including wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS) and joint ventures (JV). Non-investment 
modes such as licensing, exports and other contractual arrangements are excluded 




In order to provide a sufficient variations in the degree of institutional forces on 
the choice of foreign entry mode, this study employs a wide domain of host countries. 
Host countries spanning from America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia are 
included in the study. 
Country-of-Origin 
In order to control for nationality effects of parent companies on the choice of 
foreign entry mode, only Japanese multinationals, are included in the present study. 
Industries 
In order to control for industry effects, this study focuses only on 
manufacturing subsidiaries, with a further limited focus on the home electronics and 
automobile industries. 
Importance of the Study 
Theoretical Importance 
This study is a pioneer which treats the commonly considered exogenous 
institutional factors as explanatory variables and incorporated tliese factors into the 
dominant traditional transaction cost paradigm in foreign entry mode research. 
Traditionally, there seems to be a deep gap between sociological theories and 
international strategic management, as well as between sociological paradigms and 
economic paradigms. Thus, the incorporation of institutional theory and transaction 
cost theory in this study presents a breakthrough to the traditional literature and an 
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increment to the research arenas of foreign entry mode choice, institutional paradigm, 
and transaction cost theory. 
Methodological Importance 
The present study utilizes a large sample study with a wide coverage of host 
country information. Moreover, the study builds on a combination of comprehensive 
and updated databases of country-specific, industry-specific, parent-specific and 
subsidiary-specific variables. The richness of information provided by the present 
database provides significant contribution to the existing knowledge of foreign entry 
mode choice. 
Practical Importance 
This study offers some practical insights to both managers and policy makers. 
For the managers, the present study suggests that the choice of entry modes will be 
influenced by both the economic and institutional forces. For example, institutional 
forces may be more salient in those restricted countries such as China. In such cases, it 
is important for the managers ofboth the parent company and the subsidiary to know 
how to relax legitimacy constraints and enhance legitimacy in the eyes of the 
institutional actors. For example, developing trust relationships with the local 
government, elite business leaders, local suppliers, and customers is very critical for 
potential MNCs to invest in those restrictive countries because such trust relationships 
or "guanxi" may, in turn, determine the latitude of the mode choice that the MNEs can 
make. For the policy makers of the host country, this study will help them understand 
how they can formulate political, legal and economic policies which attract the 
potential foreign investment. 
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Structure Of The Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is briefly outlined below. 
Chapter 2 Entry Mode Choice - An Overview 
This chapter reviews the past literature on the foreign entry mode research. It 
focuses on the major streams of entry mode research, including the established 
theoretical perspectives and major empirical results. 
Chapter 3 An Institutional View of Foreign Entry Mode Choice 
This chapter presents the theoretical background for the hypotheses 
development in the study. Types of entry mode choices will be defined, followed by the 
discussion of an institutional view of foreign entry mode choices. 
Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
This chapter discusses the methodological part of the study: operationalization 
of the constructs, measurement, data collection methods, sample used, analytical 
techniques employed. 
Chapter 5 Large Sample Study Results 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical study. The results of the 
analyses ofboth descriptive and multivariate statistics are provided. 
Chapter 6 Discussion 
This chapter discusses the empirical findings and provides several implications 
for theory development and practice. 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
The last chapter provides a summary of the thesis. Both limitations and 




FOREIGN ENTRY MODE CHOICE - AN OVERVIEW 
What is “Foreign Entry Mode Choice” 
Whenever a MNE decides to enter a foreign market, it has to choose a mode of 
entry. According to Root (1987), the mode of entry is defined as an institutional 
arrangement for organizing and conducting international business transactions. The 
choice of foreign entry mode involves two decisions: the ownership choice and the 
build/buy choice. The ownership choice involves decisions regarding whether 
ownership should be ftilly owned by a single parent firm or shared between two or 
more parent firms. Previous literature has suggested that the extent of ownership 
represents the degrees of control, internalization, resource commitment, investment 
risks and returns (Anderson & Gatignon，1988; Calvet, 1984; Caves, 1982; Davidson, 
1982; Erramilli & Rao，1993; Hill, Hwang, & Kirn^ 1990; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Root, 
1987). The build/buy choice involves the choice between greenfield and acquisition 
modes. This choice is influenced by factors such as the level of urgency with respect to 
market entry, necessity of acquiring knowledge and assets, the degree of asset 
specificity and the potential of technology leakage of the parent firm (Caves & Mehra, 
1986; Hennart & Park，1993). Four foreign entry modes are defined by these two 
choices: Greenfield WOS, Acquired WOS, Greeenfield JV, and Acquired TV. The 
portfolio of foreign entry mode choices and the resulting modes are depicted in Figure 
2.1. In this study, we will focus on the ownership choice, with a particular focus on 
the modes of greenfield wholly-owned subsidiaries and greenfield joint ventures. 
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FIGURE 2.1 








Acquisition Acquired, Acquired, 
WOS JV 
Research Streams on Foreign Entry Mode Choice 
Existing research on foreign entry mode choice falls into two main streams. 
One stream focuses on identifying and examining the factors influencing the choice of 
foreign entry mode; and the other stream focuses on the relationship between entry 
mode and its performance. 
Determinants of Foreign Entry Mode Choice 
Starting from the early 1970s, much of the studies have attempted to identify 
factors influencing the choice of foreign entry mode. This section overviews the 
historical development of this research stream. Past literature in this research stream is 
organized into three stages: 1) determinants-exploratory 2) determinants-categorizing 
3) determinants-explanatory. 
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Stage 1: Determinants-Exploratory Stage (1970s) The emergence of 
research on foreign entry mode choice started with discovering determinants that 
predicted the mode choice. This line of research related the decisions on foreign entry 
mode choice to the issue of how a foreign firm should deal with the uncertainty and 
perceived risk in a host country. It was argued that entry mode choice would be 
contingent upon a firm's knowledge about, and experience of, the host country, as well 
as the cultural and national differences between the host and home countries (Dubin, 
1975; Davidson, 1980; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Stopford & Wells, 1972). Entry 
mode research at this stage was rather pre-mature for there was neither systematic 
categorization of the numerous factors affecting the mode choice nor the underlying 
theoretical foundations. 
Stage 2: Determinants-Categorizing Stage (1980s) Foreign entry 
mode research in the 1980s was viewed as determinants-categorization stage as most 
studies during this stage systematically classified the determinants of foreign entry 
mode choice into conceptually founded categories. For example, Caves & Mehra 
(1986) and Kogut & Singh (1988) both attempted to classify the determinants of 
foreign entry into three categories: firm-specific factors (e.g. firm size, country 
experience, multinational experience, diversity of product range); industry-specific 
factors (e.g. R&D and advertising intensity, industry growth, industry concentration, 
and sectional dummies); and country-specific factors (e.g. cultural distance). Later, the 
contingent relationship between firm-, industry- and country-specific factors, and the 
foreign entry mode choice was supported by Zejan (1990). Yet, the significance of 
these factors in foreign mode choice lacked a systematic theoretical backup. 
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Stage 3 Determinants-Explanatory Stage (1990-) In the 1990s, the 
determinants-categorization perspective was further developed. Hill, Hwang & Kim 
(1990) identified key contingent factors which influenced the entry mode choice such 
as control, resource-commitment, and dissemination of risk. Contractor (1990) 
identified other contingency factors such as end-product market characteristics, 
negotiation and contractual factors, technology transfer factors, and organizational 
factors. Agarwal & Ramaswami (1992), and Kim & Hwang (1992) suggested that the 
entry mode choice was contingent upon ownership, location and internalization 
advantages. 
Theoretical approaches used in this stage included: transaction cost theory (Chi 
& McGuire, 1996; Delios & Makino, 1997; Erramilli & Rao，1993; Hennart, 1991; 
Hennart & Park, 1993), eclectic theory (Agarwal & Ramaswami，1992; Kim & 
Hwang, 1992; Kogut & Zander, 1993), corporate strategy perspective (Chi & 
McGuire, 1996; Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Hill, Hwang & Kim, 1990; Kim & Hwang, 
1992), learning perspective (Erramilli, 1991; Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 1992), and 
behavioral perspective (Erramilli & Rao, 1990). Some studies combined several 
theoretical perspectives to test the linkage between these factors and foreign entry 
mode choice. Hennart and Park (1993), for example, incorporated four bodies of 
theories to examine this linkage: transaction cost theory, theory of mergers and 
acquisitions, theory of growth of the firms, and capital market imperfections theory. 
This study implies that no single theoretical perspective is sufficient to explain the 
overall picture of the determinants of foreign entry mode choice. 
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Foreien Entry Mode and Performance 
Although the mode-performance relationship is of primary importance to the 
MNEs' managers, researchers have long neglected this link. Among the limited volume 
of past research, there is no consensus regarding the relationship between the choice 
and performance of foreign entry mode. Some studies showed that there were no 
significant differences in the performance between WOS and JV (Dang, 1977; Nitsch, 
Beamish, & Makino, 1996). Some found that the performance of JV was better than 
WOS (Chowdliury, 1992), while others found the reverse (Gomes-Casseres, 1987; 
Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino, 1994). Recently, some studies found that whether 
WOS outperformed TV depended upon moderators such as local government 
restrictions (Makino & Beamish, 1997a). Still, the results of the comparison between 
the performance of WOS and acquisitions were quite consistent. Li & Guisinger 
(1991), Simmonds (1990), Nitsch et al. (1996), and Woodcock et al. (1994) all found 
that WOS had better performance than acquisitions. 
The mixed or even contradictory results found in the mode-performance 
studies are not surprising. As already indicated in the study by Otterbeck (1981), WOS 
and JV differed in the adoption of performance criteria but not in the others. This 
means that the mode-performance results may depend on what performance measure is 
to be used. In fact, performance is a multi-dimensional construct (Geringer & Hebert, 
1988) and it can be evaluated from the parent company perspective, the subsidiary 
perspective, or even the parent-subsidiary relationship perspective. Hence, the lack of 
consensus on the conceptualization and operationalization of performance construct is 
a critical concern in the mode-performance stream of research. Table 2.1 presents the 
summary of past studies in the mode-performance stream. 
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TABLE 2.1 
A REVIEW ON THE MODE-PERFORMANCE RESEARCH STREAM 
Modes 
compared* 
W J A Performance 
Studies O V C criteria Results 
S 
Dang 1977 profitability No significant difference 
V V and productivity between WOS & JV 
Otterbeck 1981 - degree of integration WOS & JV differed in some 





Gomes-Casseres ~~ instability rate JV had higher instability rate than 
1987 V V WOS 
Simmonds 1990 accounting measures AC were less profitable than new 
V V ventures 
Li & Guisinger failure rate AC had higher failure rate than 
1991 V V new ventures 
Chowdhury 1 9 9 2 - exit rate JV performance appeared to be 
V V - longevity better than WOS 
-stability of ownership 
status 




Woodcock, - financial performance new ventures outperformed JV, JV 
Beamish & Makino V V V outperformed AC 
1994 
Nitsch, Beamish financial performance WOS had better performance than 
& Makino 1996 V V V AC, and the performance of WOS 
was significantly better than JV in 
one data set but not in the other 
Makino & - financial performance WOS had lower performance than 
Beamish 1997a V V - termination rate JV in restrictive host countries 
* WOS: wholly-owned subsidiaries 




After reviewing the two dominant streams of foreign entry mode research, this 
section presents an overview of the established theoretical perspectives in the entry 
mode research. Two well-established theoretical approaches are the transaction cost 
theory and the eclectic paradigm. 
Transaction Cost Approach to Entry Mode Choices 
Transaction cost theory provides a conceptual basis to analyze the efficiency of 
an exchange (Williamson, 1975). In simple terms, transaction costs refer to "those 
costs associated with an economic exchange that vary independent of the competitive 
market prices if the goods or services exchanged" (Robins, 1987: 69). Such costs arise 
because of the existence of market failure, which is caused by factors such as bounded 
rationality, opportunism, uncertainty, small number bargaining and asset specificity 
(Williamson, 1975). The transaction cost theory, hence, deals with finding the most 
efficient governance structure for the exchange, that is, market, hierarchy, or hybrid 
(Williamson 1975, 1985). 
The transaction cost theory is a very powerfixl conceptual tool for both 
organizational and strategic analysis (Robins, 1987). It is also a usefiil and popular tool 
to analyze the choice of foreign entry mode. A major strength of the application of the 
transaction cost approach to entry mode research is that it can help managers to 
determine the most efficient level of ownership in terms of the degree of control and 
investment risks (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Studies based on transaction cost 
theory suggested that higher asset specificity would lead to higher-control mode while 
greater uncertainty would result in increasing delegation to foreign partners (Anderson 
& Gatignoi^ 1986, Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Erramilli & Rao，1993; Kim & 
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Hwang, 1992). The empirical studies supported the applicability of transaction cost 
framework in the entry-mode research for the samples of the US MNEs overseas 
(Erramilli & Rao，1990; ErramilH & Rao, 1993; Kim & Hwang, 1992; and Shane, 
1994) and of the Japanese subsidiaries in East and Southeast Asia (Delios & Makino, 
1997). 
Another strength of the transaction cost framework is its ability to explain 
under what conditions joint ownership becomes a preferred choice over WOS, and 
which partner should be selected. The transaction cost theory views shared ownership 
as a way to combine complementary assets or intermediate inputs that suffered from 
market failure (Delios & Makino, 1997; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1988) and 
identifies conditions under which the cooperative form is chosen over WOS. 
Despite the strong empirical support to the transaction cost approach, it suffers 
from a number of deficiencies. The foremost weakness is that the transaction cost 
approach cannot fiilly explain which entry mode is more successful than another and 
when. This is because the primary purpose of the theory is to explain when a joint 
venture (or a wholly-owned subsidiary) is preferred over a wholly-owned subsidiary 
(or a joint venture). Besides, transaction theory just emphasizes the cost-efficiency 
side, but ignores the revenue-effectiveness aspect, in choosing an entry mode 
(Madhok, 1995; Sharfinan, Gray & Yan, 1991). The transaction cost theory also 
ignores sociostructure and suprastructure of institutional forces, which may influence 
the entry mode choices (Erramilli, 1996; Sharfinan, et al. 1991). Hence, in this study, 
transaction cost theory will be taken as part of the framework for the understanding of 
economic-based factors in influencing the entry mode choices, and it will be integrated 
with other theoretical perspectives in order to form a more complete picture on foreign 
entry modes. 
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Eclectic Approach to Foreign Entry Mode Choices 
The Eclectic Theory of International Production (Dunning 1980) provides a 
framework for defining the context in which the foreign entry mode choice is made. 
The theory suggests that the propensity of a MNE to engage in international 
production rests on three determinants: ownership advantages, location advantages, 
and internalization advantages. 
The ownership advantages concern the extent to which a firm possesses the 
resource endowment that its potential and existing competitors do not have (Dunning, 
1980). The location advantages involve comparative advantages in location-specific 
endowments. They include not only the Ricardian type endowments such as natural 
resources, labor supply and proximity to market, but also the legal and economic 
environment of the host country such as government policies and market structure of 
the host country (Dunning, 1980). The final component of the eclectic theory, the 
internalization advantages determine whether a MNE should market or internalize its 
transfer of intermediate goods under common ownership and control due to the 
existence of the imperfection of their market. 
Contributions provided by tlie Eclectic Paradigm to the field of entry mode 
choice are three-fold: First, unlike the transaction cost theory, the eclectic theory 
addresses both the cost-efficiency side (reduction of transaction costs by 
internalization) and the revenue-effectiveness side (exploitation of ownership 
advantages into a host country) of entry mode choice. Second, the eclectic paradigm 
provided a more systematic framework to examine both the ownership (control) choice 
and the build/buy or partner contribution choice. Finally, the applicability of the 
eclectic theory in the foreign entry mode research has been evidenced by many 
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empirical studies (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Hill, Hwang & K H 1990; 
Woodcock, Beamish & Makino, 1994). 
However, the eclectic paradigm is not without limitations. The ultimate 
weakness is that the eclectic approach suffers from its eclecticism. It seems that the 
eclectic paradigm is a general theory which includes all kinds of factors so that it can 
explain all the cases (Rugman, 1980). In the eclectic paradigm, each of the three 
advantages is treated as an independent determinant of a firm's FDI decision, and a 
possible interaction or causal relationship between these advantages is not clearly 
e邓lained (Woodcock, 1994). Besides, the discriminant validity of the three 
components in the theory was fixrther questioned by Itaki (1991). He argued that 
ownership advantage is indistinguishable from internalization advantage, and it is also 
inextricably linked to location advantages. Without a clear consensus on the 
discriminant validity for each of the components, operationalization of the constructs 
underlying ownership advantages, location advantages, and internalization advantages 
will be difficult, and thus, the empirical results cannot be interpreted without cautions. 
Yet, no matter liow one would argue for the discriminant validity among the 
three components, the eclectic paradigm, by itself, still provides unique contributions 
to the entry mode research because at least the three components reflect firm-, 
industry-, and country-specific factors which influence firms' FDI decisions. So, the 
eclectic theory is still a useM framework for examining the motives and consequences 
of foreign entry mode choices. What additional effort one should put is the enrichment 
of the scope of the variables. 
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Overview of Past Empirical Studies 
This section reviews both empirical and methodological issues of foreign entry 
mode research. Past empirical studies were examined based on several dimensions. 
First, most empirical studies of foreign entry mode were large-sample studies 
using secondary data and cross-sectional in nature. Second, a majority of the literature 
used the samples of either US-based MNCs in foreign countries or non-US based 
MNCs in the US. Thus, empirical evidence obtained in the previous studies needs to be 
re-validated in other empirical settings. Besides, the sample size differs among studies, 
ranging from as small as less than 100 to as large as over 2000, implying variations in 
the statistical power of the results. Finally, the popular data-analytical technique is 
logistic model since dichotomous dependent variable is used. Table 2.2 summarizes the 
major methodological details of the selected empirical entry mode studies conducted 
during the last decade. 
Concerning the methodological issue in the foreign entry mode research, there 
is often a dilemma between statistical significance and practical significance. A 
controversial issue in foreign entry mode choice research is the use of proxy variables 
such as the use of R&D and advertising expenditures to proxy for asset specificity. The 
major rationale behind the use of proxy is the difficulty in measuring constructs and 
obtaining data and the lack of established scale. The result is the formation of a vicious 
cycle. Hence, a tradeoff exists. While a large sample with secondary data allows the 
researchers to use more sophisticated statistical techniques and have greater statistical 
significance of the results, the tradeoff is low construct validity of the proxy. Though 
the use of proxy is a conventional research method in the fields of international 
business and strategic management, methodological improvement should be made by 
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using multiple proxy variables and/or applying different proxy variables under different 
research contexts. 
TABLE 2.2 
A SUMMARY OF SELECTED PAST EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON 
FOREIGN ENTRY MODE CHOICE (1988-1997) 
Study E m p i r i c a l S a m p l e Sample Data Perfor- Data analysis 
setting size collection mance techniques 
(entries) method measures 
used 
Factor-Mode Stream 
Kogut & cross-sectional Foreign entrants~ 228 Secondary proxies Multi-nomial 
Sin曲 1988 in US sources logit model 
Erramilli & cross-sectional US service f i r m s ~ 628 Mail survey self-estab- Wilcoxon 
Rao 1990 lished scale tests 
Hennart cross-sectional Japanese 158 Secondary proxies Binomial 
1991 manufacturing sources logistic model 
MNEs in US 
Kim& cross-sectional US manufacturing 137 Mail survey Self- MANOVA 
Hwang MNEs eveloped 
1992 ndicator and 
cales 
Erramilli & c r o s s - US service MNEs 381 Secondary Scale and Logistic 
Rao 1993 sectional sources proxies egression 
Wei 1993 Longitudinal, China-foreign JVs 1676 Secondary proxies Multiple 
1979-1985 sources regression 
model 
Hennart & cross-sectional Japanese 270 Secondary proxies Binomial 
Park 1993 subsidiaries in US sources logistic model 
Shane 1994 cross-sectional US-based Two Secondary proxies Linear 
manufacturing samples sources regression 
MNCs 1977:86 model 
• 1982:166 
Barkema, cross-sectional Dutch firms 225 Secondary proxies Event history 
Bell & sources analysis 
Pennings 
199 6 . 
Delios & cross-sectional Japanese MNEs in 1902 Secondary proxies Logistic 
Makino East and sources regression 
199 7 Southeast Asia 
Mode-Performance Stream 
Chowdhury cross-sectional US-based MNEs 180 Secondary proxies Chi-square 
1992 sources analysis 
Woodcock, cross-sectional Japanese 321 Secondary proxies Breakpoint 
Beamish manufacturing sources regression 
& Makino subsidiaries in analysis 
1994 Canada and US 
Nitsch， cross-sectional Japanese 173 Secondary proxies ANOVA 
Beamish & subsidiaries in sources 
Makino Europe 
1996 
Makino & cross-sectional Japanese 917 Secondary proxies Correlation 
Beamish subsidiaries in sources analysis 
1997a Asia 
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Comment on Existing Literature 
The transaction cost theory and the eclectic paradigm can be classified in the 
realm of an economic theory of foreign entry mode choice. The entry mode 
determinants considered under both perspectives primarily involve economic factors 
that can minimize the costs and/or maximize the revenue of choosing a particular mode 
of entry. In this way, both approaches provide imperfect implications regarding the 
foreign entry mode choice decisions as they neglect non-economic factors which would 
influence such decisions. 
Transaction cost theory has been criticized in terms of both its assumptions and 
implications. Transaction cost theory can only be a partial lens on the decision of 
foreign entry mode choice. With its narrow focus on cost minimization under the 
restrictive assumption of opportunism, transaction cost theory is inadequate in and of 
itself in the analysis of the governance mode calculus (Madhok, 1997). For example, 
Erramilli (1996) argued that if firms of a certain nationality have an intrinsic desire for 
a certain level of ownership, the assumptions of transaction cost theory that low-
owaership, market modes represent the default choice would not be strictly valid. 
Hence, Madhok (1996) suggested that transaction cost theory is more applicable in 
guiding the details of governance instead of the choice of form per se. 
In terms of implications, it is criticized tliat the insights provided by transaction 
cost analysis is specific to a firm or industry only (Robins, 1987). Robins (1987) 
argued that the neglect of opportunities to gain new insight into organization-
environment relations may be a more serious liability of the transaction cost approach. 
Teece (1986) also commented that the focus of transaction cost theory is on more 
microlevel transaction characteristics such as asset specificity. In the analysis of foreign 
entry mode choice, the transaction cost perspective is primarily oriented towards the 
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selection of entry mode which can minimize the transaction cost associated with the 
exploitation of an existing advantage. Consequently, being limited itself to the 
particular transaction context, transaction cost theory denies: 
1) the 'open-system' view of the firm and the idiosyncratic institutional 
environment embedded in a particular host country 
2) the freedom of decisions regarding the choice of foreign entry mode that a 
firm can make under the same external and internal conditions 
3) the foreign entry mode as arena to accumulate or acquire host country-
specific advantages 
Dunning's (1980) eclectic paradigm extends the scope of foreign entry mode 
determinants from firm-specific ownership advantages and transaction-specific 
internalization advantages to country-specific location advantages. Dunning (1991a) 
also offers a comprehensive list oflocational factors whicli includes not only Ricardian 
type endowments but also cultural, political, and institutional factors. Nevertheless, the 
eclectic paradigm is still bounded in the concept of production cost, utilizing inputs in 
which the home country is relatively well endowed and using resources in which the 
host country is relatively well endowed. When applying in foreign entry mode choice 
decisions, empirical studies adopting eclectic paradigm suffer from: 
1) treating the ownership, internalization, and locational advantages as equally 
important, mutually independent factors, as in Hill, Hwang, & Kim's (1990) study 
2) a very limited scope of country-specific locational factors, e.g. market 
potential and investment risk in Agarwal & Ramaswami's (1992) study 
3) a lack of sophisticated measures of country-specific factors, e.g. using 
subjective perceptual managerial measures in Hill's et al. (1990) and Agarwal & 
Ramaswami's (1992) studies. 
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When a firm decides to invest overseas, the first question to ask is which 
country to enter and why. As suggested by Gomes-Casseres (1990), what a firm 
wants may be different from what it can actually get in the host country. So, county-
specific factors should be of inherently importance in determining firms' decisions on 
entry mode choice. Surprisingly, the study of the influence of country-specific factors 
on foreign entry mode choice is still in the preliminary stage and provides limited 
insights with regard to the impact of country-level institutional factors on the decision. 
[Appendix ! provides a detailed summary of the use of country-specific variables in 
foreign entry mode research]. 
First, the theoretical foimdations for the use of country-specific variables are 
not well developed. Besides the dominant perspectives like transaction cost theory and 
eclectic paradigm, some other theoretical perspectives were adopted to explain the 
influence of country-specific variables on the choice of foreign entry mode, such as 
bargaining power approach, global strategic perspective, international risks 
perspective. Yet, there are no systematic theoretical foundations for the use and the 
choice of country-specific variables in the entry mode choice research. Most studies 
incorporated country-specific variables in order to have a more thorough set of 
explanatory variables. 
Second, the scope of country-specific variables in existing studies is extremely 
narrow. This may be due to the fact that most theoretical perspectives in the entry 
mode research are restricted to the economic paradigm. Almost all the existing 
empirical studies that examines country-specific factors, in fact, used the same country-
specific variables: country risks, host government restrictions, socio-cultural distance, 
and market potential. In fact, a country is an entity that consists of a wide scope of 
political, economic, social and cultural factors. Though some of the conceptual studies 
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have proposed a wider scope of country-specific variables (e.g. In Minor, Wu, & 
Choi's 1991 study, the variables they proposed included legal/political favorability, 
socio-cultural similarity, and technological strength), they have not been empirically 
tested yet. 
Third, the measures used in the foreign entry mode choice research fail to 
capture the multidimensional aspects of country-specific variables. For example, most 
researchers measured country risks by sourcing data from the 1982 Benchmark Survey 
by the US Department of Commerce and using Contractor's (1990) calculation 
method; and measured socio-cultural distance by using Hofstede's (1980) cultural 
value indexes and Kogut & Singh's (1988) method. These indices were developed over 
fifteen years ago and may not capture recent political practices and socio-cultural 
characteristics of the host countries. Some researchers tried to use alternative methods 
such as questionnaire survey (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Kim & Hwang, 1992; 
Brouthers, 1995). However, the sample size in these studies was relatively small and 
the results cannot be generalized. Still, we have to recognize that the availability of 
data and measures of country-specific variables will have critical contributions to the 
use of country-specific factors in foreign entry mode choice research. 
In conclusion, existing studies on foreign entry mode choice can boast neither 
empirical nor theoretical rigor. In this study, we aim to 1) provide a suitable theoretical 
foundation, the institutional theory, to explain the influence of institutional factors on 
the foreign entry mode choice decision and 2) generate a comprehensive measure of 




FOREIGN ENTRY MODE CHOICE - AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Overview of Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory has been widely applied to explaining social, economic, and 
political phenomena. Yet, despite its wide application, the concepts of the institutional 
theory have still not been consolidated (Scott, 1987b). The conceptual variety and 
vagueness are striking. Scott (1987b) described tlie development of institutional 
theory was still in the stage of adolescence: 
"Some versions are much more carefiilly defined and explicit about 
their definitions and referents, while others are less clear in 
conceptualization." (Scott, 19871):493) 
Similarly, DiMaggio and Powell noted: 
"Scholars who have written about institutions have often been rather 
casual about defining them; institutionalism has disparate meanings in 
different disciplines; and, even within organization theory, 
institutionalists vary in their relative emphasis on micro and macro 
features, in their weightings of cognitive and normative aspects of 
institutions, and in the importance they attribute to interests and 
relational networks in the creation and dffiision of institutions." 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991:1) 
Thus, as Scott (1987b) suggested, the first step to understand the institutional 
theory is to recognize that there are different ways of defining the key concepts of the 
theory. I will briefly review some of the representative perspectives of the institutional 
theorists based on five dimensions: central questions, definitions, mechanisms, 
consequences, and levels of analysis. 
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Central Questions 
First, the central questions raised by the institutional theory focus on different 
phenomena such as: organizations' adaptation to the external environment (Selznick, 
1957), nature and origin of social order (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Jepperson, 1983), 
the homogeneity of organizational patterns (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1977)， 
and the shaping of social behavior (Scott, 1987a, 1995). 
Definition 
Second, the concepts of institutionalization are defined in similar but different 
ways. As summarized by Scott (1987b), institutionalization has been defined as "a 
process of instilling value" (Selznick, 1957), "a process of creating reality" (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967; Jepperson, 1983 ; Zucker, 1977)，or "a class of elements" (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987a, 1995). 
Mechanism 
Third, for the types of mechanisms through which institutionalism comes into 
effects, theorists have stressed on one or another, or several as central. According to 
Scott (1987a, 1995), pillars of institutions are either regulative, normative, cognitive, 
or historical. The regulative pillar stresses on conformity to rules. The normative 
aspect puts the emphasis on a moral base for assessing legitimacy, A cognitive 
emphasis on legitimacy derives from a common frame of reference and symbolic 
interpretations of the situation. The historical aspect emphasizes the "natural history" 
of the evolution of a living form that is adaptively changing over time (Selznick, 1957). 
From Table 3.1, it is seen that there is a growing emphasis on the cognitive aspect, and 
the trend is towards using multiple mechanisms together. 
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Institutionalization Outcomes 
Fourth, outcomes of institutional effects vary among studies. The divergence 
among the studies regarding institutionalization outcome is relatively small partly 
because the factors affecting institutionalization outcomes are inter-related. Still, 
institutional theorists put slightly different weightings on the institutionalization 
outcomes. Some stress on firm's survival, stability, and legitimacy; while others 
emphasize institutional isomorphism. 
Level of Analysis 
Finally, the level of analysis varies among studies. Some researchers focus on 
micro-, and others focus on macro-level phenomena. Up till now, most studies have 
focused on the macro-level phenomena such as organizational field, societal, or 
organizational population. 
In summary, while there are some basic recurring themes, there is little 
consensus on the definitions of key concepts in the theoretical tradition of the 
institutional theory. In fact, some scholars proposed that the institutional approach 
itself needs to be "institutionalized" (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). Hence, when 
conducting research on institutional theory at this stage of divergence, one should be 
careful of identifying which perspective of the theory is to be used (Scottb, 1987). 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Which Version of Institutional Theory to Be Used 
As indicated in the previous section, there are various perspectives on the 
concept of institutional theory. In order to clarify the scope of the study, the following 
section discusses which perspective of institutional theory will be adopted in the 
present study. 
Phenomenon To Be Explained 
Among the various domains of the institutional theory, the present study will 
limit the focus to the relationship between multinational enterprises and institutional 
environment in a host country. Specifically, we will examine how the institutional 
environment shapes the MNEs' decisions on the foreign entry mode choice in a host 
country. 
The basic assumption behind the institutional view on the organization-
environment relationship is "institutional embeddedness" which refers to the 
interconnections between a population and its institutional environment (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). It is assumed that all organizations' behavior are embedded in both the 
task, technical environment as well as the relational, institutional environment (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1983; Scott, 1987a; SharJ&nan, Gray & Yan, 1991). 
Following this assumption, the present study focuses on the relationship 
between MNEs and their host country institutional environment. MNEs have to 
transcend national borders and face strong isomorphic pulls from the host country on 
their structures that are not fiiUy accounted for by efficiency criteria (Lu & Lake, 1997; 
Westney, 1993). To survive, subsidiaries of the MNEs need to adapt themselves to, 
and become isomorphic with, the local environment (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991; 
Westney, 1989). Hence, it is important to recognize how local subsidiaries of MNEs 
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come to reflect the values, norms, and locally accepted practices of the societies in 
which they operate (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991: 345). However, there are few 
empirical studies which examined the relationship between the behaviors and strategies 
of MNEs and their host country institutional environments. This study attempts to fill 
this conceptual and empirical cavity in the studies of MNEs. 
Definition of Institution 
In this study, we will narrow the scope of institutional theory to the 
institutional environment which is defined as the environment characterized by "the 
elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organizations must conform 
in order to receive legitimacy and support" (Scott, 1987a: 126). Here, institutional 
environment refers specifically to the national environment of the host country in which 
the MNEs set up their subsidiaries. We consider institutions as a set of systems 
consisting of regulative, cognitive, and normative structures and activities in the host 
country environment that influences MNEs' choice of entry mode through the 
enforcement of laws, rules, and norms (North, 1990; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 
1995). They are vehicles for activity within constraints. As suggested by Jepperson 
(1983: 146), "all institutions are frameworks or rules establishing identities and activity 
scripts for such identities". Hence, institutions embody '^ programmed actions" (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1967: 75) and thus common response to situations. In this study, the 
'programmed actions" are reflected in the mode of entry by the MNEs. 
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Mechanism 
In this study, we focus on the regulative, normative, cognitive, and historical 
institutional mechanisms through which the MNEs' foreign mode choice decisions are 
shaped. Regulative mechanism refers to the established laws, rules, and regulations 
acting as a kind of sanction to shape social behavior. Normative mechanism includes 
shared values and norms, which define the legitimate means to social expectations. 
Cognitive mechanism involves the frames through which meaning is made such as the 
symbolic systems, and the rules which constitute the nature of reality such as cultural 
rules (Scott, 1995). Finally, the historical mechanism refers to the conformity of 
organizations to their established norms in the past. 
Consequence 
In this study, it is argued that decisions regarding to the choice of foreign entry 
mode are constrained by institutional factors embedded in the legal, social, and cultural 
environments in a host country. According to the traditional institutional theory, if the 
decision of foreign entry mode choice is influenced solely by such institutional factors, 
the survival and legitimacy outcomes of a MNE in the host country are already implied 
in the founding conditions of particular foreign entry mode. In our study, the foreign 
entry mode chosen already is viewed as the product of the institutionalization process. 
Specifically, the present study focuses on the resulting dominant isomorphic mode of 
entry, i.e. wholly-owned subsidiary or joint venture, in each host country. It is 
predicted that a particular mode of entry is more likely to be adopted by the MNEs in 
one country due to differences in national institutional environments. 
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Level of Analysis 
Existing organizational theories such as ecological theory, resource dependence 
theory, and institutional theory have extensively examined the organization-
environment relationship. However, these studies have rarely included national 
boundaries as the primary scope of analysis. Among few theories of organization, 
institutional theory gives prominence to the legal and cultural factors which are 
country-specific in nature, assuming that institutional environments are implicitly 
congruent with national boundaries (Lu & Lake, 1997; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). Thus, the present study focuses on different institutional 
environments at country or national level as a primary unit of analysis. 
Summary 
The clarifications of which version of institutional theory to be used in this 
study are summarized as follows: 
TABLE 3.2 
VERSION OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN THE STUDY 
• ^ f o i l i c l f e ^ ^ jU-W-- •：....:):...:,..:..::. ：- -. ..:..::....;..::::..::. Version：.....,.:.:. . “ ~ ~ 
Phenomenon examined Influence of host country institutional factors on the 
choice of foreign entry mode 
Definition Institution as a set of structures and activities in the 
host country environment that influences MNEs' 
choice of entry mode through the enforcement of 
laws, rules, and norms 
Mechanisms Regulative, normative，cognitive, and historical 
Consequence National isomorphic pattern in foreign entry mode 
Level of analysis National level: institutional environments 
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A Conceptual Model of Institutional Factors and Foreign Entry Mode Choice 
The present study attempts to offer a comprehensive framework of foreign 
entry mode choice by integrating both institutional factors and economic factors 
together. Institutional theory proposes that organizations are social as well as technical 
entities with their structures and processes which are not shaped by technical 
rationality only. And transaction cost theory states that human beings are boundedly 
rational and opportunistic, and they are required to complete transactions with high 
degree of uncertainty and asset specificity. People can minimize transaction costs under 
environmental constraints. Therefore, it can be seen that the two perspectives cannot 
provide spherical explanations to organizational phenomenon, but one has to be 
supplemented by the other. 
Further, according to Meyer and Scott (1983), organizations are embedded in 
two types of organizational environments: technical and institutional. 
"Technical environments are those in which organizations produce a 
product or service that is exchanged in a market such that they are 
rewarded for effective and efficient performance. These are 
environments that foster the development of rationalized structures 
that efficiently coordinate technical work By contrast, institutional 
environments are characterized by the elaboration of rules and 
requirements to which individual organizations must conform in order 
to receive legitimacy and support." (Scott, 1987a: 126) 
Both types of environments place pressures on all organizations to which they 
must be responsive if they are to survive. Yet the extent ofboth types of pressures vary 
among organizations, organizational fields, and national boundaries. Hence, our 
conceptual framework proposes that the choice of foreign entry mode is determined by 
a portfolio of institutional factors and transaction cost factors. 
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Institutional Factors and Foreign Entry Mode Choice 
In contrast to economic theories, institutional theory argues that organizations 
are not free to pursue their task oriented goals for efficiency maximization. 
Institutional environments are vehicles for activity within constraints. Jepperson 
(1983) suggested all institutions were frameworks or rules establishing identities and 
activity scripts for such identities. Transcending across boarders, an MNE needs to 
create such an identity in a foreign institutional environment. The MNE has to conform 
to the mode of entry approved by the host country and adapt to the local culture so as 
to gain legitimacy and survival. The MNEs' equity structures, hence, come to reflect 
the institutionalization outcome which is derived from the 'taken for granted' rules, 
norms, culture, and social practice (Abell, 1995; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Consequently, the mode of entry will be increasingly homogenous within the host 
country. 
Institutions are taken as a set of systems consisting of regulative, normative, 
and cognitive structures and activities which may affect organizations through rules 
and norms (North, 1990; Powell & DiMaggio，1991; Scott, 1995). On this basis, we 
classified the sources of institutional pressures on the choice of foreign entry mode into 
three types: host country restrictiveness, cultural distance between home- and host-
countries, and the historical norm of the entry mode of the parent company in a 
particular host country. 
Host country restrictiveness and foreign entry mode choice 
Subsidiaries are business organizations registered in the host countries under 
the specific political, legal, economic, and socio-cultural systems. When entering a 
foreign host country, the MNEs will encounter differences in these systems between 
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home and host countries. Rather than being passive, the MNEs will attempt to obtain 
legitimacy and survival by adapting to the host country's political, legal and social 
environments. So, host country environment, acting as an exogenous institutional 
pressure, should be of great importance to the MNEs in determining the choice of 
foreign entry mode. 
According to North (1990), there are two types of constraints from the 
institutional environment - formal and informal. Formal constraints include formal 
political (and judicial) rules, economic rules and contracts. Informal constraints include 
the norms and value systems of a society, that is, its culture or ideology. 
From the institutional perspective, the state is a coercive mechanism through 
which organizations within the same institutional environment are forced to adopt 
similar structures and processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The role of the state acts 
as a sanctioning authority which determines how organizations should behave and 
which organizations can exist. Compared to indigenous organizations, foreign 
subsidiaries in the host countries are under more discriminative institutional pressure 
from the host government. According to Poynter (1985), there are three types of 
government restrictions upon foreign subsidiaries: 1) general/strategic, which are 
imposed on the parents' equity ownership, locus of control, nature of business and 
bureaucratic harassment 2) financial, which are imposed on foreign exchange control, 
exports requirements and profit repatriation limits 3) operational, which are imposed 
on location, localization of value-added activities and staffing. Scott (1987a: 131) also 
states that the power forces from the state can shape the environment of all types of 
organizations, through tax and regulatory policies, labor and antitrust law, subsidiaries 
and contracts and numerous other ways. 
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Derived from the institutional perspective, we can postulate that host country 
institutional environment can restrict the choice of foreign entry mode through 
immediate restrictive measures such as government restrictions on equity ownership as 
well as through contextual restrictive measures such as general business 
supporting/hindering facilities, rules and regulations, and social expectations. Previous 
studies on the relationship between local government restrictions and choice of foreign 
entry mode suggests that the more restrictive the host government is, the more likely 
that the MNEs prefer a shared-ownership form such as an equity joint venture than a 
sole-ownership form (i.e. a wholly-owned subsidiary) (Fagre & Wells, 1992; Lecraw, 
1984; Contractor, 1990). With both theoretical and empirical support, we hypothesize 
that: 
HI: The more restrictive the host country is, the more likely the MNEs 
will choose a joint venture mode over a wholly-owned subsidiary 
mode. 
Cultural distance and foreign entry mode choice 
From the institutional perspective, culture is regarded as both normative and 
cognitive systems which shape organizations or organizational fields (Scott, 1987a) 
and informal mechanisms through which institutionalization occurs (Hill, 1995; 
Jepperson, 1983). According to Jepperson, cultures are rules, procedures, and goals 
without primary representation in formal organization, and without monitoring and 
sanctioning by some "central" authority. These rules are, rather, customary or 
conventional in character." (Jepperson, 1983: 151). 
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Entering into a host country which is socially and culturally constructed in a 
different way, an MNE will incur a lot of uncertainties regarding local market 
conditions, customer taste, business norm, access to local resources, and the ways of 
getting things done in the host country. Therefore, it is postulated that the more 
culturally distant an MNE from the host country, the more likely that the MNE will 
choose a joint venture mode of entry over a wholly-owned subsidiary mode. This is 
because through the cooperation with and mimeting the local partners in a joint 
venture, it is faster for the MNE to acquire local knowledge, and adapt to the local 
value and interpretation systems, thereby gaining legitimacy and increasing the chance 
of survival. 
Previous empirical studies which examined the relationship between national 
culture and the choice of entry mode generally suggest that MNEs are more likely to 
enter the host country through a joint venture than a wholly-owned subsidiary when 
the cultural distance between home and host countries is large. Using a sample of 228 
entries into the United States, Kogut and Singh (1988) found that transaction cost 
explanations for the entry mode choice must be qualified by factors stemming from the 
institutional and cultural context in a host country (Kogut & Singh, 1988). They 
speculated that greater costs would be attached to the management of acquisitions and 
wholly-owned than joint ventures subsidiaries in the more culturally distant countries. 
The findings confirmed that the greater the cultural distance between the country of 
MNEs and the host country, the more likely a firm would choose a joint venture over 
wholly-owned subsidiary and acquisition. Agarwal (1994) even found that the strength 
of the relationship between cultural distance and the choice of a joint venture mode is 
so strong that it was not moderated by firm-specific factors including technological 
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intensity and size as well as country-specific factors including country risk and market 
potential. 
Based on the theoretical rationale and empirical evidence, we hypothesize that: 
H2: The greater the cultural difference between the country of the MNE 
and the country of entry, the more likely the MNEs will choose 
a joint venture mode over a wholly-owned subsidiary mode. 
Historical norm and foreign entry mode choice 
In this study, we incorporate an evolutionary historical perspective to analyze 
the choice of foreign market entry. North (1990) argues that institutions are shaped by 
historical factors that limit the range of options open to decision makers. It is argued 
that inertia plays an important role in institutional persistence. Organizations may 
conform to the previously established mode because the cost of making changes may 
outweigh the prospective gains from alternations. Similarly, Scott (1987b) suggests 
that certain structural features are decided not by rational decision but because they are 
taken for granted as this is 'the way these things are done'. This form of 'taken-for-
granted decisions forms an important basis for the persistence of organizational form 
over time. 
No empirical studies on foreign entry mode choice has confirmed firm's 
conformity to previous established mode of entry. Yet, the theory generally implies 
that other conditions being equal, firms tend to follow the organizational form 
previously chosen due to the inertia to change. Based on the rationale of organizational 
imprinting, we hypothesize that: 
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H3: The more frequently that an MNE chose a joint venture (wholly-
owned subsidiary) mode of entry in a particular host countty, the 
more likely that the MNE will continue to choose a joint venture 
(wholly-owned subsidiary) mode over a wholly-owned (joint venture) 
subsidiary mode in the same host country in the future. 
Transaction Cost Factors and Foreign Entry Mode Choice 
Currently, the choice of entry mode is dominantly explained by the transaction 
cost factors. It is argued that MNEs will choose a mode of entry that can minimize the 
transaction costs. A typical test of the transaction cost theory on the choice of 
ownership structure is the one conducted by Hennart (1991). Using the Toyo Keizai 
database, Hennart examined the ownership policies of investors of a single home 
country (Japan) in a single host country (United States). In this study, we will retest 
most of the transaction cost variables which had been used in Hennart's (1991) study, 
including diversification, parent experience, parent R&D intensity, parent advertising 
intensity, relative size of subsidiary to parent, and subsidiary age. An additional 
transaction cost variable is at the country level: host country market potential. This is 
because rather than focusing on a single host country as in Hennart's (1991) study, our 
study will focus on multiple host countries. 
Host Market Potential 
Compared with the choice of wholly-owned subsidiary, a joint venture mode 
can result in lower transaction costs and thus will be preferred in a high-growth host 
country. The greater the market potential of the host country, the greater the 
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opportunity for firms to get higher returns; but simultaneously, high-growth market 
will attract new entrants and therefore lead to more intense competition. So, firms 
would like to share ownership in order to commensurate with the higher risks 
associated with commitment of resources. Moreover, Gomes-Casseres (1990) 
suggested that the more attractive an host country, the more an MNE will willing to 
trade away their ownership for the access to the market. In this study, the host country 
market potential is proxied by the GDP growth of the host country and we hypothesize 
that: 
H4a: The higher the GDP growth of the host country, the more likely the 
MNEs will choose a joint venture mode over a wholly-owned 
subsidiary mode. 
Diversification 
According to Hennart (1991), when entering an unrelated business, firms will 
find that intermediate inputs such as product-specific knowledge and market access are 
more efficiently transferred through joint venture partners which possess these inputs 
than through a self-development or replication, i.e. wholly-owned subsidiary 
establishment. In this study, we choose seven types of diversification which are 
unrelated to the manufacturing sector, including 1) sales, 2) service, 3) R&D, 4) 
finance, 5) holding, 6) marketing research/strategic plarming, or 7) totally unrelated 
business. It is predicted that compared to the entry into manufacturing sector, an entry 
into either one of the above seven unrelated industries will be more likely through a 
joint venture mode. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
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H4b: MNEs who diversify into unrelated sector are more likely to choose a 
joint venture mode over a wholly-owned subsidiary mode. 
Parent Experience 
Firms entering a new host country market suffer from disadvantages over local 
firms with regard to market-specific knowledge or access to local distribution network. 
Such knowledge is tacit，and therefore its purchase is subject to high transaction costs 
(Hennart, 1991). Consequently, firms tend to acquire this knowledge from joint 
venture partners or through self-development (Makino & Delios, 1996). However, 
once the parent firms have accumulated the necessary knowledge by learning-by-doing 
process in the host country, they may prefer to choose full control over the new 
subsidiaries in the same host country (Anderson & Gatignon, 1988). Hence, it is 
predicted that while new entrants will prefer joint ventures to acquire local knowledge, 
firms with previous operational experience in a host country will choose a wholly-
owned subsidiary mode since they feel less need to share the ownership with local 
partners, with regard to local knowledge transfer. Hence, 
H4c: The greater the parent experience in the host country, the less likely 
that the MNEs will choose a joint venture mode over a wholly-
owned subsidiary ntode. 
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Asset Specificity 
One of the main convergent results that most transaction cost studies found in 
the field of foreign entry mode choice is the effects of asset specificity of the parent 
firms on foreign entry mode choice. Asset specificity refers to the degree to which the 
assets possessed by the firm are unique to its transaction. Past empirical studies 
supported a positive relationship between asset specificity and the propensity for firms 
to form a wholly-owned subsidiary (Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; Erramilli & Rao, 
1993; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Hennart & Park, 1993; Kim & Hwang, 1992). 
Two proxies for asset specificity are used in this study. The first proxy is R&D 
intensity which has been extensively used as an indicator of a firm's possession of 
proprietary knowledge (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Hennart, 
1991; Hennart & Park, 1993; Kim & Hwang，1992; Kogut & Singh, 1988). The 
second proxy is advertising intensity of the parent firm, which serves as an indicator of 
the level of goodwill assets and of marketing e^qperience transferred to the affiliate 
(Hennart, 1991). 
So, it is predicted that higher asset specificity (i.e. higher R&D intensity or 
higher advertising intensity) would lead to the choice of a wholly-owned subsidiary 
over a joint venture since a higher-control mode enables the parent firm to appropriate 
higher economic rent derived from the firm's proprietary asset advantages (Teece, 
1981); and to reduce any unwanted dissemination risks (Rugman, 1980). 
H4d: The higher the R&D intensity of the parent firm，the less likely that 
the MNEs will choose a joint venture mode over a wholly-owned 
subsidiary mode. 
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H4e: The higher the advertising intensity of the parent firm，the less likely 
that the MNEs will choose a joint venture mode over a wholly-
owned subsidiary mode. 
Relative Size of Subsidiary to Parent 
Hennart (1988) suggested that firms seek complementary inputs (e.g. 
technological know-how or local market knowledge) from other firms have an 
incentive to acquire these inputs through either acquisition of, or joint venture 
formation with, the firms which possess the needed resources. It is more likely for 
firms to engage in joint venture formation when the needed complementary inputs held 
by the partners cannot be separated from unwanted ones. On this basis, Hennart (1991) 
predicted that the smaller the size of the parent, the less likely that it lias the resources 
to acquire the local firms which holds the complementary assets, and the more likely 
that it will form a joint venture with another firm. Therefore, a negative relationship 
between the relative subsidiary size and the choice of a joint venture mode is predicted 
in this study. 
H4f: The larger the size of subsidiary relative to its parents，the less likely 
that the MNEs will choose a joint venture mode over a wholly-
owned subsidiary mode. 
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Subsidiary Age 
Hennart (1991) found that the older the subsidiary, the more likely it will form 
as a wholly-owned subsidiary. This is because as the parent firm accumulates local 
knowledge over time, it tends to rely less on the local partner(s) as a source of local 
knowledge, leading to dissolution of joint ventures. Thus, a negative sign is expected 
on the influence of subsidiary age on the choice of joint venture. One thing to mention 
is that though both parent firm experience and subsidiary age are measuring firm's 
familiarity with host country conditions, they are serving as a surrogate for host 
country e邵erience at the MNE level and foreign subsidiary level respectively. 
H4g: The older the subsidiary in the host country, the more likely that it 




The primary research method adopted in this study is a large sample study of 
751 subsidiaries established by 10 Japanese MNCs in 59 countries. One thing needed 
to highlight in this study is the uniqueness of the database. The database used in this 
study was combined from three sets of well-established databases: 1) the Kaigai 
Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 1996 (Toyo Keizai, 1996) which is well-known for its 
comprehensiveness of Japanese subsidiaries' information; 2) the Analysts' Guide 1996 
(Daiwa Institute of Research Ltd., 1996) which contains longitudinal financial 
information ofthe Japanese parent firms listed in the Tokyo stock exchange; and 3) the 
World Competitiveness Report 1995 (IMD International & World Economic Forum, 
1995), which provides a comprehensive set of data at a country level. It should be 
noted that China, the country which has not yet been studied in previous research on 
cultural distance using Hofstede's cultural value indexes, was included in the present 
study. Hence, we believe that the empirical results in this study will make significant 
contributions to providing new evidence since the database created in this study 
contains, to our knowledge, the most comprehensive anf the most updated subsidiary-, 
parent-firm-, and country-specific information. 
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Sample 
The sample was selected from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 1996 (Toyo 
Keizai, 1996). The data was based on a questionnaire survey of all Japanese companies 
listed on the Japanese stock exchanges as well as of some unlisted firms. To enhance 
the data set, the survey was supplemented with press releases, annual reports and 
telephone interviews. Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 1996 (Toyo Keizai, 1996) lists 
about 15,300 subsidiaries of 3,600 Japanese parents with 5 percent or more equity 
ownership all over the world. This database is one of the most comprehensive 
databases available in Japan (Horaguchi, 1992) and has been extensively used in recent 
international business studies by researchers (Hennart, 1991; Hennart & Park, 1993; 
Hennart & Reddy, 1997; Makino & Beamisli, 1997a; Nitsch, Beamish, & Makino, 
1996; Padmanabhan & Cho, 1996; Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino, 1994). 
The sample Japanese MNCs consists of the five largest (in terms of sales as of 
March 1996) home electronics companies (Matsushita Electric Industrial, Hitachi, 
Toshiba Corporation, NEC Corporation, and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation) and the 
five largest automobile companies (Toyota Motor Corporation, Nissan Motor, 
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, Honda Motor, and Mazda Motor Corporation). The 
summary of the company profiles is presented in Table 4.1. 
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TABLE 4.1 
PROFILE OF SAMPLE COMPANIES* 
— — Total sales in Sales from Number of Number of Number of 
US$million foreign employees foreign countries 
(lUS$=107.35yen) subsidiaries in subsidiaries invested 
USSmillion 
Home electronics industry 
Matsushita 41,736 N.A.** 48,745 182 41 
Hitachi 38,439 185,878 75,590 87 28 
Toshiba 34,588 N.A. 71,170 88 26 
NEC 32,127 N.A. 40,857 78 29 
Mitsubishi 25,634 91,676 47,752 65 25 
Automobile industry 
Toyota 74,123 N.A. 68,641 51 29 
Nissan 32,773 269,698 44,782 65 22 
Honda 23,778 N.A. 28,383 19 32 
Mitsubishi 22,799 N.A. 28,987 92 14 
Mazda 13,445 56,065 26,072 24 14 
* All the information of the company profiles were reported as of March 1996 from the Analysts' Guide (Daiwa 
Institute of Research Ltd., 1996). 
** Not available 
Home electronics and automobile industries were selected in this study because 
both are highly globalized industries. According to Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 
1996 (Toyo Keizai, 1996), the home electronics industry and automobile industry 
together accounted for 33.6% of the total number of overseas subsidiaries in the 
Japanese manufacturing sector. Since these two selected industries have their 
subsidiaries spreading over a large number of countries, country-specific effects on the 
foreign entry mode choice can then be systematically examined. 
The ten companies were selected as the sample for analysis due to two reasons: 
First, as our focus in the study is to examine the impact of country-specific institutional 
factors on the choice of foreign entry mode, MNEs with foreign subsidiaries 
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established in a larger number of countries are desirable. In our sample, the 10 selected 
companies have their subsidiaries across 59 countries. On average, these 10 companies 
have 76 subsidiaries each, and the average number of countries invested by each 
company was 26. Second, the 10 companies in the two industries provided a 
sufficiently large sample of foreign entry decisions. The total number of foreign 
subsidiaries formed by these companies was 751，with 500 (out of 2,888) in the home 
electronics industry and 251 (out of 893) in the automobile industry. Thus, the sample 
represents 17.31% and 28.1% of the total number of foreign direct investment in the 
two industries respectively. 
The ten sample companies involved 751 foreign entry mode choice decisions in 
total, of which 659 cases were wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures. The 
balance was subsidiaries invested through acquisitions or capital participation, and 
These cases were removed from the sample. Cases with incomplete information were 
also removed. The final sample consisted of 556 cases available for analysis. 
Parent company information are obtained from the Analysts' Guide (Daiwa 
Institute of Research, 1997). The Analysts's Guide provides a variety of ftmdamental 
company information (including investment and management indicators as well as basic 
financial data) on 1,124 Japanese domestic non-financial companies whose stocks are 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as of July 31, 1996, excluding banks, securities 




Foreign entry mode choice Foreign entry mode is used as the dependent 
variable, defined as a dummy variable, coded 0 for a wholly-owned subsidiary and 1 
for a joint venture. Subsidiaries that were formed as a result of either acquisition or 
capital participation are excluded in order to eliminate any possible confounding effects 
of acquisitions and capital participation. In this study, subsidiaries are classified as 
wholly-owned subsidiaries when the Japanese parent firm has 100% equity ownership . 
On the other hand, subsidiaries with their Japanese parents having less than 100% 
equity ownership are defined as joint ventures. From the 751 cases in our sample, there 
were 333 (44.3%) entries classified as wholly-owned subsidiaries and 326 (43.4%) as 
joint ventures. 
Independent Variables 
I. Institutional Variables 
As mentioned in the earlier session，the study of the influence of country-
specific institutional factors on foreign entry mode choice is deficient in having a 
strong theoretical foundation, capturing the multi-dimensional nature of constructs, 
1 The distinction between wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures has been a controversial 
issue. Some researchers (Anderson & Gatignon，1986; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; Hennart, 1991; 
Padmanabhan & Cho，1996) proposed a 95% equity ownership as the cutoff point to differentiate 
between WOSs and JVs. In this study, we used a 100% cutoff point to differentiate a WOS and a JV 
because we think that WOS should be an equity owned by one and only parent. If an equity is owned 
by more than one parent, we should treat it as a JV. To confirm whether a 100% or 95% cutoff point 
really matters, we conducted a comparison analysis. We conducted the regression analysis twice with 
the same independent variables but different dependent variables (using 100% cutoff point in the first 
time and 95% in the second), and we found that there was no much difference between the two. There 
was less than .10 difference in the overall classification rate and the same independent variables 
which were found having significant influence on the dependent variable. Consequently, we remained 
to use the 100% equity ownership as the cutoff point in the study. 
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and devising sophisticated measurement. Hence, in this study, we attempt to capture 
the multi-dimensionality of the country-specific constructs by employing the following 
measures: 
Host country restrictiveness Host country restrictiveness is defined as the 
extent to which foreign investment is either prohibited, restricted or intervened by the 
host country environment. Two host country restrictiveness variables primarily used in 
previous entry mode choice studies are the degree of host government ownership 
restrictions and the country risk ratings. 
Contractor (1990) studied the effect of the liberation of host government 
ownership restriction on the ownership position of U.S. foreign subsidiaries across the 
world. The study identified a clear reduction in the number of 50-50 and minority joint 
ventures in the 1980s. Other studies such as Nitsch, Makino, & Beamish (1996) and 
Padmanabhan & Cho (1996) also showed a negative relationship between the degree 
of host government ownership restrictions and the probability of choosing a wholly-
owned subsidiary over a joint venture. However, Gomes-Casseres (1990) suggested 
that the relationship between the degree of ownership restrictions and the level of 
equity ownership position is not as straightforward as previous studies suggested. He 
found that the choice of ownership position would depend not only on host 
government ownership restrictions but also on firm preference as well. 
Corrqjared with host government ownership restrictions, the impact of country 
risks had a more inconsistent result on the choice of foreign entry mode. While some 
studies (Anderson & Gatignon, 1988; Brouthers, 1995) suggested that the leVel of host 
country risks was positively associated with the likelihood for a firm to choose a mode 
of wholly-owned subsidiary, other studies (Erramilli & Rao, 1993; Hill, Kim & Hwang, 
1990; Kim & Hwang, 1992) suggested that the greater the host country risks, the more 
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likely firms would choose a shared-control mode. Some researchers even suggested 
that there were no significant effects ofhost country risks on the choice of entry mode. 
In the present study, we aim to explore a comprehensive set of host country 
restrictiveness variables. To do so, we selected host country-specific variables from the 
World Competitiveness Report 1995 (IMD Inteniational & World Economic Forum, 
1995). The World Competitiveness Report is an annual multi-dimesional analysis about 
the competitiveness of nations. In the Report, there are 8 factors with 378 sub-items 
representing the political, economic, socio-cultural, human and education dimensions 
of around 50 countries. The quality of the data in the Report is guaranteed as it was 
combined from both hard data (statistical indicators obtained from international and 
regional organizations, private institutions and national institutes) and soft data (An 
Executive Opinion Survey containing 130 items sent to about 21,000 executives in top 
and middle management in all the countries in the Report and the response rate was 
more or less 20%). The 1995 World Competitiveness Report provides country-specific 
information across 49 countries2 including 25 OECD members (Belgium and 
Luxembourg are treated as a single country), and 24 newly industrialized economies 
and emerging market economies. 
From the 1995 World Competitiveness Report, 21 items were selected based 
on subjective assessment of their potential impacts on the choice of foreign business 
activity in the host country. For a parsimony reason in subsequent analysis, the 21 
items were consolidated into several summarized factors through an exploratory factor 
2 The 49 countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, Columbia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, USA, and 
Venezuela. 
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analysis. Tabachnick & Fidell (1989) proposed that an exploratory factor analysis is an 
appropriate method to create variables when one seeks to describe and summarize data 
by grouping together variables that are correlated, and when one does not have any 
underlying theory for the choice of variables. We chose the principal components 
method as the factor extraction method to reduce a large number of variables down to 
a smaller number of factors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). Kaiser's criterion with 
varimax rotation was applied. Varimax rotation method is chosen as it can produce 
invariant factors which are easier for subsequent analysis and interpretation (Gorsuch, 
1983). 
Adopting the criterion of the eigenvalue equal to or greater than one (Gorsuch, 
1983), a four-factor structure was obtained that accounts for 86.3 percent of the total 
variance. All the items were loaded cleanly on the four factors. The rotated factor 
matrix is shown in Table 4.2. 
Factor 1 was labeled as infrastructure restrictiveness as the 10 items loaded on 
it reflected the infrastructure environment of the host country. Infrastmcture has never 
been treated as an institutional factor in previous studies. Some may doubt the use of 
infrastructure as one of the host country restrictiveness factors as it is without any 
previous empirical support. However, in this study, infrastructure is treated as the 
result of the national economic development policy of the host country. Infrastructure 
should be a critical factor of the host government in encouraging and restricting 
foreign business activities in the host country including the entry mode choice decision. 
And geo-economics studies (Smith & Florida, 1994; Head, Ries, & Swenson, 1995) 
provided empirical evidence that infrastructure such as transportation and urbanization 
are related to the industrial location decisions of manufacturing establishments, and 
different feasibility of infrastructure will result in different patterns of geographic 
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patterns of industrial locations. Based on the effect of infrastructure on the geographic 
isomorphism of industrial location, we consider infrastructure as an institutional factor 
which shapes firms' decision on foreign entry mode choice. The two risks items 
(political risks" and "financial risks") represented the stability of the political and 
financial systems in the host country. The "antitrust law" item reflected the legal 
system of the host country. And the transportation, "telecommunication", 
"technological level", and utility items were indicators of the economic and 
technological strengths of the host country. The Cronbach's alpha of the 10 items was 
0.9265, and all items had their item-total correlations exceed 0.8, suggesting that there 
was a good internal consistency among the items. 
Factor 2 was labeled as government restrictiveness. The seven items loaded all 
represented the degree to which tlie host government intervenes in the business 
environment of the host country. The items loaded include the extent to which host 
government hinders business development in the host country ('bureaucracy", "trade 
policy", "protectionism"), distorts fair competition in the domestic economy ("state 
interference", "state control of enterprises"), and treats all enterprises in a financially 
equal manner ("fiscal policy"). Though two of the above items ("state control of 
enterprises" and "protectionism") had cross loadings on two factors (the loading 
difference was less than 0.1), they were not dropped from the factor for validity 
reason. Internal consistency was achieved as the Cronbach's alpha was 0.9562 and 
item-total correlations ranged from 0.77 to 0.92. Government restrictiveness 
represents the extent of regulative or coercive forces on foreign investment, which may 
have a significant effect on the entry mode choice decisions. 
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TABLE 5.6 
RESULTS OF EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 
OF HOST COUNTRY RESTRICTIVENESS ITEMS 
„ F a c t o r 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Variable Variable descriptions Infrastructure Government Ownership Ethnic 
N a m e restrictiveness restrictiveness restrictiveness restrictiveness 
c roads Roads infrastructure does not meet business .89662 
requirements very well 
c rail Railroads infrastructure does not meet business .85514 
requirements very well 
c techno Technological infrastructure is developed slower .83549 
than in your competitor countries 
c_porisk Political risk rating by the Country Risk Guide 1995 .82411 
c air Air transport infrastructure does not meet business .81969 .40635 
requirements very well 
c_port Port access infrastructure does not meet business .78319 -40516 
requirements very well 
c telcom Telecommunications infrastructure does not meet .76476 
business requirements very well 
c anti Anti-trust laws do not prevent unfair competition in .74801 
your country 
c firisk Financial risks rating by the Country Risk Guide .72578 .44931 
1995 
c_power Power supply infrastructure does not meet business .69948 -47076 
requirements very well 
c fiscal Fiscal policy does not treat all enterprises in an .89092 
equitable manner 
c trade Trade policies in your country hinder international .85894 
activities in long-term 
c bureau Bureaucracy hinders business development .42991 .82951 
c interf State interference hinders development of business .78405 
c_sa Strategic alliances are not common between .47936 .68693 
domestic and foreign firms 
c stctrl State control of enterprises distorts fair competition .46267 .60966 .57138 
in your country 
c_protec National protectionism prevents foreign products and .43635 .55828 .51296 
services being imported 
c owner Foreign investors are not free to acquire control in a .81398 
domestic company 
c—invest Investment in the economy is highly directed by the .79330 
government 
c ethno Foreigners are not treated equally to citizens in all .90811 
respects 
c cultur National culture is closed toward foreign culture .85285 
Eigenvalues 13.67 2.14 1.40 0.90 
Variance explained 65.1 10.2 6.7 4.3 
Cumulative variance 65.1 75.3 82.0 86.3 
Cronbach's alpha .9265 .9562 .7984 .7828 
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Factor 3 and Factor 4 had only two items loaded. Nonetheless, they were 
included in the subsequent analysis since the eigenvalues of these two factors were 
greater than 1.0. Factor 3 was labeled as ownership restrictiveness as the two items 
were indicating the restrictions of the host government on the ownership position of 
the enterprises. Cronbach's alpha was 0.7984, and the item-total correlation was 0.70. 
Obviously, ownership restrictiveness exerts immediate influence on the foreign entry 
mode choice decision. 
Factor 4 was labeled as ethnic restrictiveness. The first item in this factor 
measured the extent to which the national culture of the host country citizens is open 
to foreign culture. The second item measured the ethnocentricity of the host country 
citizens, that is, the degree to wMch foreigners are treated equally to host country 
citizens in all respects. Grouping together, ethnic restrictiveness reflects the ethnic 
beliefs and attitudes of the host country citizens towards foreigners, which should be 
distinguished from the construct of socio-cultural distance used in previous literature. 
Apart from the conceptual distinctions between ethnic restrictiveness and socio-
cultuial distance, statistical correlation results also showed that ethnic restrictiveness 
not only had a negligible correlation (-.0002) with socio-cultural distance measured by 
Hofstede's (1980) cultural indexes and Kogut & Singh's (1988) method, but it was 
also correlated only moderately with Hofstede's four cultural value dimensions: 
individualism (-.0969), masculinity (-.2262)，power distance (-.1375) and uncertainty 
avoidance (.2423). Hence, ethnic restrictiveness can be considered as distinct socio-
cultural construct, and the use of this construct in the foreign entry mode research will 
be very contributory. Cronbach's alpha was 0.7828 and the item-total correlation was 
0.64. Factor scores of the four explored factors were estimated using the regression 
analysis and the resulting standardized factor scores were used in subsequent analysis. 
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In summary, we have explored a four-dimensional construct of host country 
restrictiveness. This construct was consolidated from the most up-to-date data source 
(i.e the 1995 World Competitiveness Report) with the largest number of country-
specific variables (i.e. 21 items) covering the largest number of countries (i.e. 59 
countries). Since the results from a single source of database may be biased, we 
conducted another correlation analysis of our four restrictiveness dimensions with 
similar constructs from alternative data sources, including the Index of Economic 
Freedom 1995 (Johanson & Sheehy，1995)3, host government ownership restrictions 
ratings from the 1982 Benchmark Surveys by the U.S. Department of Commerce4, two 
country risk ratings conducted by Euromoney5 (1987) and Institutional Investor6 
(1987) respectively. 
From Table 4.3, we recognize that all the four host country restrictiveness 
variables explored from our factor analysis were significantly correlated with the above 
four alternative measures (except between government restrictiveness and Benchmark 
Survey's ownership restrictions, and between ownership restrictiveness and Index of 
3 The Index of Economic Freedom is an annual index which measures the extent of economic freedom 
over 100 countries around the world . It is a composite index based on ten economic factors: 1) trade 
policy 2) taxation policy 3)government consumption of economic output 4)monetary policy 5) capital 
flows and foreign investment 6) banking policy 7) wage and price controls 8) property rights 9) 
regulation 10)black market. The higher the score, the more government interference in the economy 
and hence, the less economic freedom there is. 
4 The so-called Benchmark Surveys of the U.S. Department of Commerce are generally conducted 
every five years by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Every U.S.-based firms that has an 
affiliate abroad larger than a minimum size is expected to respond to the questionnaire which covers 
many aspects of U.S. direct investment abroad, including the proportion of affiliates required by the 
host country to limit U.S. parent's equity, that is, host government ownership restrictions. 
5 The Euromoney credit rating score is a weighted average of three indicators: 1) market indicators 
which covers access to bond markets, selldown performance (a measure of oversubscription or 
otherwise of an issue) and access to trade finance (forfeiting) (40%) 2) credit indicators, incorporating 
payment record and rescheduling difficulties (20%) 3) analytical indicators, including political risks, 
economic indicators and economic performance forecasts (40%) (Cosset & Roy, 1991). 
6 Institutional Investor is a measure of a country's creditworthiness which is based on ratings by 
leading international banks. Bankers were asked to assess each country on a scale of zero to one 
hundred with zero indicating the least creditworthy countries and one hundred representing the most 
creditworthy ones. Individual responses were then weighted according to an unpublished formula that 
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economic freedom). Two implications can be derived from these results. First, host 
country restrictiveness is a multi-dimensional construct. The results of the correlation 
analysis suggests that both of the existing measures and our four e>q)lored variables are 
tapping on different dimensions of host country restrictiveness. Second, the four 
alternative measures can fairly be explained by the four restrictiveness variables created 
in our study. On this basis，we can conclude that the four newly created variables in 
our study have a high level of construct validity. 
"properly gives more weights to responses from banks with the largest worldwide exposure and the 



















































































































































































































































































































































Cultural Distance In this study, cultural distance is defined as the 
difference between the national culture of the Japan - the home country of the sample 
parent firms investigated in the study - and those of the host countries in which their 
subsidiaries are located. Cultural distance has intrigued heavy research in the prior 
studies of foreign entry mode choice. The construct is measured in terms of psychic 
distance (e.g. O Grady & Lane，1996)，perceptual questionnaire survey (e.g. 
Brouthers, 1995), and cultural block classification (Ronen & Shenkar, 1985). Among 
those measures, Kogut and Singh's (1988) measure of cultural distance has been most 
frequently used. Nonetheless, past studies that used Kogut & Singh's cultural distance 
measure provided mixed implications with regard to the impact of cultural distance on 
the choice of foreign entry mode. Some studies found that greater cultural distances 
led to more frequent use of joint ventures over wholly-owned (greenfield) subsidiaries 
and acquisitions (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Agarwal, 1994). Conversely, some found that 
wholly-owned subsidiaries were preferred over joint ventures in culturally distant 
countries (Benito & Gripsn^, 1992; Delios, Makino, & Beamish, 1996; Padmanabhan 
& Cho, 1996). Other studies even did not find a clear impact of cultural distance on the 
choice of foreign entry mode (Erramilli & Rao, 1993) or the effects varied (Barkema, 
Bell & Pennings, 1996). 
In the present study, we use Japan as the reference country which has not been 
extensively investigated before, and calculate the cultural distance between Japan and 
forty-four host countries. 
Following Kogut and Singh, cultural distance was calculated from Hofstede's 
(1980, 1991) four dimensions of cultural value, namely power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Hofstede calculated these four cultural value 
indices based on a large-scale empirical study using 88,000 national employees of the 
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IBM Corporation in 53 countries. Totally, Hofstede's cultural value index is the most 
appealing measure of national culture available in terms of the size of the sample and 
the codification of cultural traits along a numerical index (Kogut & Singh, 1988). 
Adopting the formula developed by Kogut and Singh (1988), we developed a 
composite index for each parent-subsidiary pair based on their deviations from one 
another for each of the four cultural value dimensions. The cultural distance for each 
possible parent-subsidiary country pair was calculated using the formula as follows: 
CDjk = In Z{(D/y - T>ik)2 /V/)}/4 
where CDjk stands for the cultural difference between countries j and k, D/j is the score 
for parent country j, i.e. Japan, on the i th cultural dimension, Dik is the score for 
subsidiary host country k on the i th cultural dimension, and V/ stands for the variance 
of the index for the i th cultural dimension. The formula corrects for the variance and 
the average of each cultural dimension and averages across the four dimensions. Table 
4.4 lists the four cultural value indices and the composite cultural distance computed 
for each of the 44 countries used in our analysis. 
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TABLE 5.6 
CULTURAL INDICES AND CULTURAL DISTANCE SCORES FOR 44 COUNTRIES 
！ Country PDI IDV MAS UAI CDScore 
I w w w w v v v w v v w y v w w w v w w w w v w w w w v w w w w w w w w M W W V W W W W W W W W W V W W W W W W V W W W W b / W W V W W W W W W W W W W W V W W A A W V W V W V W V W - W - W W W W d V W W V W - W A W y W W W - V " 二 
I China7 90 20 66 40 3.71 
j Taiwan 58 17 45 69 4.13 | 
I Hong Kong 68 25 57 29 i75_J 
I Thailand 64 20 34 64 6M_\ 
丨 Singapore __74 20 48 S T93\ 
Malaysia 104 26 50 36 
Philippines 94 32 64 44 3.66 
Indonesia Z§ l i 46 48 5A9_\ 
1 India 77 48 56 40 4.12 
；Korea 60 18 39 85 4/74| 
：Pakistan 55 14 30 . 70 3 .46] 
i Norway 31 69 8 50 12-33 
I' Sweden 31 71 5 29 14.48 [ 
Denmark 18 74 16 23 12.74 
I United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 M 2 J 
Ireland 28 70 68 35_ ^ 
i Netherlands 38 80 14 53 10.76 
I Belgjum^uxembottrg 65 15 54 94 2.69 
1 France 68 71 43 86 4A5_\ 
1 Germany 35 67 66 65 L ^ J 
I： Si»itzerland 34 68 70 58 LElJ 
1" Portugal 63 27 31 104 6.08 
i^pain 57 51 42 86 4.05] 
：iteiy 50 76 70 75 1-32 
j'Au^ria 11 55 79 70 1.62 | 
G r e e c e “ 60 35 57 112 2.36 ： 
I Turkey 66 37 45 85 3J0\ 
U S A j 40 91_ 62 46 3.50 
丨 Mexico 81 30 69 82 1.46 
"Columbia 67 13 64 80 
'"Guatemala 95 6 37 101 
i E. Salvador §6 19 40 94 l ^ J 
� C o s t a Rica 35 15 21 86 W ] 
j Venezuela 81 12 73 76 L ^ J 
r ^ ^ 6 4 16 42 87 4.32 
"Braril 69 38 49 76 3 . ¾ 
'：Argentina 49 46 56 86 2.21 
' C M e 63 23 28 86 6.62 
I' Panama 95 11 44 86 4.91 [ 
i South Africa 49 65 39 49 ^741 
j East Africa _ 6 4 27 41 52 53]_\ 
1 Morocco 77 20 46 54 iZZJ 
I Australia 36 90 61 51 MLJ 
New Zealand 22 79 58 49 3.91 
7 The cultural indices for China were absent in Hofstede's original study. These four cultural indices 
were obtained after a direct contact with Prof. Geert Hofstede (The actual response from Prof. 
Hofstede is attached in Appendix 2). The estimated indices for China can also be found in Hofstede 
(1993), but the indices in the present study are the most updated ones. The indices for China here 
were obtained from Hofstede based on his separate study. Hence, the indices for China used in the 
present study are more comparable than those obtained from the 'replication' studies which included 
the China indices [Birnbaum-more, Wong & Olve (1995) adopted a group-level analysis instead of the 
individual one as in Hofstede's original studies; Lai & Lam (1986b) used a different computation 
method from Hofstede's]. 
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Historical Norm Historical norm is a measure of the extent to which the 
parent firms follow their past or historical decisions on foreign entry mode. Here we 
measure the historical norm by counting the frequency of firm's choice of joint venture 
before a wholly-owned subsidiary is established. From the historical aspect of the 
institutional perspective, the decisions of a firm at one point in time are in fact 
influenced by the residues of past processes (Scott, 1987a). Incorporating such a 
historical perspective in the choice of foreign entry mode, firms may make a decision 
not based on rationality but their habitualized routine in the past So, it is predicted that 
the more joint ventures a firm formed in the past, the greater tendency that the firm 
would continue to choose a joint venture mode in the future. 
n. Transaction Cost Variables 
In this study, we will retest most of the transaction cost variables which had 
been used in Hennart's (1991) study, including diversification, parent experience, 
parent R&D intensity, parent advertising intensity, relative size of subsidiary to parent, 
and subsidiary age. One transaction cost variable at the country level is also used: host 
country market potential. 
Host Market Potential In this study, host country market potential is 
proxied as the GDP growth of the host country. The data of GDP growth rate is 
obtained from the World Competitiveness Report (IMD International & World 
Economic Forum, 1995) which computes the real GDP growth as the annual 
compound percentage change on a local currency basis between 1990 and 1994. 
Diversification To measure whether the entry takes place in an 
unrelated industry or not, an industry dummy is used with 0 indicating that the entry is 
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a related one, i.e. in the manufacturing industry and 1 if it is into an unrelated industry, 
including 1) sales, 2) service, 3) R&D, 4) finance, 5) holding, 6) marketing 
research/strategic planning, or 7) totally unrelated business. This industry dummy 
variable predicts that compared to the entry into the manufacturing sector, an entry 
into either one of the above seven unrelated industries will lead to the choice of a joint 
venture mode. The data was obtained from the Analysts' Guide (Daiwa Institute of 
Research, 1997). 
Parent Experience Parent experience is proxied by the number of years 
since the establishment of the Japanese parents' first subsidiary in a host country. The 
data was obtained from the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 1996 (Toyo Keizai, 1996). 
Asset Specificity Two measures are used as proxies for asset specificity: 
RScD intensity and advertising intensity. R&D intensity is measured as the percentage 
of the parent firm's research and development expenditures to its total annual sales. 
Advertising intensity is measured by the ratio of the parent's advertising expenditures 
to its total annual sales. The data of both measures of asset specificity were obtained 
from the Analysts' Guide (Daiwa Institute of Research, 1997). 
Relative Size of Subsidiary to Parent The size of subsidiary relative to its 
parent is defined as the ratio of the relative subsidiary assets to parent assets in 1995. 
The data of parent's total assets were obtained from the Analysts' Guide (Daiwa 
Institute of Research, 1997), and those of subsidiary total assets were obtained from 
the Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 1996 (Toyo Keizai, 1996). 
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Subsidiary Age Subsidiary age is proxied by the number of years since the 
establishment of the subsidiary in the host country. The data were obtained from the 
Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 1996 (Toyo Keizai, 1996). 
Appendix 3 lists all the dependent and independent variables used in our 
empirical analysis. Variable descriptions, data sources, and predicted effects on foreign 
entry mode choice for each variable are summarized in the appendix. 
Analysis 
With a binary dependent variable, wholly-owned subsidiary vs. joint venture, a 
binomial logistic regression analysis is used to examine the effects of independent 
variables on the foreign entry mode choice. The model examines the effects of host 
country-specific institutional factors on the likelihood for the parent firms to choose a 
joint venture mode (coded 1) over a wholly-owned subsidiary mode (coded 0). In an 
equation form, tlie model examined is specified as: 
Probability of a JV mode = l/(l+exp( y)) 
where 
Y = p � + piXi + p2X2 + p3X3 + …+ pnXn + 8 
In the above equation, Xb X2,…Xn are the independent variables, and (3i, |32,... |3n are the 
corresponding coefficients. p0 is the intercept and 8 is a disturbance term. The 
predictive ability of the model can be assessed by the comparison of the estimated 
model's classification rate to the random classification rate. Large %2 values and small 
p-values indicate statistical significance. A positive sign of a regression coefficient 
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indicates that an increase in the variable will lead to an increase in the likelihood of the 
choice of a JV over a WOS, while a negative sign indicates an increase in the 
likelihood of the choice of a WOS over a JV. 
To examine the joint contributions of transaction cost factors and country-
specific institutional factors to the explanation of foreign entry mode choice, we 
conduct three hierarchical regression analyses. In Model la, only transaction cost 
variables are entered. In the Model lb, the influence of country-specific institutional 
variables on foreign entry mode choice is examined. In the fixll model, both transaction 
cost and institutional variables are examined simultaneously. Interpretations will be 
emphasized on the change of the overall classification rate and, any changes in both the 
direction and significance of the relationship between each independent variable and 
the foreign entry mode choice. Furthermore, separate regression analyses are 




Relationships Among Variables 
Table 5.1 summarizes the correlations among the independent variables. The 
Pearson's correlation analysis shows that the coefficients of any single pair of 
predictors did not exceed 0.50. Hence, we conclud that there is no critical 
multicollinearity problem among the independent variables. 
Overview of the WOS and JV Distribution among Countries 
Table 5.2. provides the summary the distribution ofWOSs and JVs across the 
59 countries in the sample. It is found that the choice between WOS and JV do differ 
across countries (x2 =402.48 , p < 0.01; r = -.35, p < 0.01). This suggests that 
Japanese parents tend to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries in many of the developed 
countries such as U.S.A., United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, France, Italy, 
Canada, and Australia. On the contrary, a larger proportion of the subsidiaries are 
jointly owned in those less developed countries like China, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Malaysia. In countries such as Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Switzerland, Hong Kong, 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF WOS AND JV IN THE SAMPLE 
Countries WOS JV Total (Percent) 
1 Argentina 3 _ 0 3 ( 0 5 ) 
2 Australia 17 5 2 2 ( 3 - 3 ) , 
3 Austria 3 0 _ 3 (0 .5) 
4 Belgjum/Luxembourg 7 4 U 
5 Brazil 8 7 15 (2.3) . 
6 Buima 0 0 
7 Canada 11 5 16 (2.4) 
8 Chile _ J 0 1 (0-2) 
9 China 4 _51_ 61 (9.3) 
10 Columbia 1 2 1 ( 0 2 ) 
11 Costa Rica 1 2 1 (0 .2) 
12 Czedi. Republic 0 1 1 (0 .2) 
13 Detimark 1 1 (0 .2) 
14 Dubai 1 0 1 (0 .2) 
15 E. Salvador 1 \ 2 (0 .3) 
16 EastAfiica 0 1 1 (0 .2) 
17 France H ？l 1 3 (2 0 ) 
18 Germany 22 9 31 (4.7) 
19 Greece 1 2 1 (0 .2) 
20 Guam 1 2 1 (0 .2) 
21 Guatemala 1 2 1 (0 .2) 
22 HoagKaQg 1 § 1 5 (2 3 ) 
23 Hungary 0 2 2 (0 3) 
—24 India 0 8 8 (1.2) 
25 Indmesia 1 XL 1 8 ( 2 7 ) 
—26 Iran 0 2 2 (0.3)_ 
—27 Ireland 2 0 2 (03)_ 
28 Italy 9 1 10 (1.5) 
29 Korea 0 1 1 (0 .2) 
30 Kuwait 2 
31 Latin America 1 2 1 (0 .2) 
32 Malaysia 13 21 3 4 (5 .2) 
33 Mexico 5 1 1 2 ( 1 8 ) 
34 Morocco 0 I 1 (0 .2) 
35 Netherlands l i I 1 5 (2 .3) 
36 New Zealand 3 1 4 ( 0 6 ) 
37 Nigeria 0 2 2 (0 3) 
"38 NcLay 2 0 2(0.3) 
39 Panama ? 1 3 (0 .5) 
40 Pakistan 0 I 1 (0 .2) 
"41 Peru 2 3 5 (0.8) 
42 Philippines 4 9 13 (2.0) 
43 Poland 0 I 3 (0 .5) 
44 PortuRal - 0 4 4 (0.6) 
45 Puerto Rico 1 I 2 (0 .3) 
46 Saudi Arabia 0 1 1 (0 .2) 
47 Scandinavia 2 1 3 (0 .5) 
48 Singapore 18 13 31 (4.7) 
49 South Africa 0 1 1 (°-2) 
50 Spain 9_ Z 1 6 (2 .4) 
51 Swedai 1 2 1 (°-2) 
52 Switzerland 3 4 7 (1.1) 
53 Taiwan 8 12 20 (3.0) 
54 Thailand 3 43 . ； 46 (7.0) 
55 Turkey 0 I 3 (°-5) 
56 U.S.A. 88_ 43 131 (19.9) 
57 XJhited Kingdom 37 10 47 (7.1) 
58 Vaiezuela 3 1 4 (0.6) 
59 Vidnam 0 1 1 (02) 
T ^ d ' 333 326 659 
(50.5%) (49.5%) (100%) 
Chi-Square 402.48 p <0.01 
Pearson's R --35 p <0.01 
68 
Logistic Regression Analysis 
Overall Model 
Table 5.3 provides the summary of the results of the logistic regression 
analysis. The model chi-square tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all the 
variables in the current model, except the constant, are equal to 0. This is comparable 
to the overall F test for regression (OLS). The chi-square for the foil model is 220.11 
(p<.001), which is a significant improvement from the restricted model that includes 
only either the transaction cost variables (model %2 二 190.85, p<001) or institutional 
variables (model %2 二 149.77, p<001). This result suggests that both the transaction 
cost model and institutional model have significant contributions to explaining the 
choice of foreign entry mode. 
The overall classification rate tells whether the probability of the choice of 
entry mode is greater (or less) than that by chance. Model la includs transaction cost 
variables only. In this model, 72.59% of the 629 entries are classified correctly, of 
which 216 were WOSs and 221 are JVs. Model lb includs institutional variables only. 
In this model, the overall classification rate is 72.97%, with 270 cases for WOSs and 
189 for JVs. The full model yields the highest overall classification rate (75.67%) when 
both the transaction cost variables and institutional variables are entered. Of the 596 
foreign entries, 232 WOSs and 219 JVs are correctly predicted. These results generally 
suggest that the incorporation of institutional variables received preliminary support to 
the explanation of foreign entry mode choice. And this support is as strong as the 
transaction cost variables. 
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TABLE 5.6 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
(FULL SAMPLE) 
Dependent Variable: WOS = 0, JV 二 1 
Model la Model lb Model 2 
Variables B Wald B Wald B Wald “ 
Transaction cost variables: 
1. GDP growth 0.23*** 49.55 0.18** 13.55 
2. Diversification 
2.1 Sales -1.10*** 23.72 -0.92*** 14.82 
2.2 Service -0.64 1.79 -0.49 1.02 
2.3 R&D -2.27** 10.86 -1.91* 7.15 
2 4 Finance -4.05*** 14.88 -3.68** 12.17 
2.5 Holding -2.97** 12.54 -2.61* 9.00 
2.6 Marketing/strategic planning -2.00* 7.02 -1.89卞 4.88 
2.7 Totally unrelated -0.84 2.06 -0.70 1.24 
3. Parent experience -0.021" 3.78 0.00 0.06 
4. Parent R&D intensity -0.121" 4.56 -0.16* 7.38 
5. Parent advertising intensity 1.66*** 22.07 1-49*** 16.39 
6. Subsidiary relative size 0.24 1.14 0.28 1.54 
7. Subsidiary age -0.03* 6.54 0.00 0.00 
Institutional variables: 
8. Infrastructure restrictiveness -0.74*** 62.85 -0.46** 14.03 
9. Government restrictiveness -0.08 0.57 -0.25 2 8 8 
10. Ownership restrictiveness -0.62*** 37.15 -0.21 2.62 
11. Ethnic restrictiveness -0.10 115 -0.03 0.10 
12. Cultural distance -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.30 
13. Historical norm 0.14* 8.86 0.09 1.65 
Constant -0A9 0.86 -0.16 0.34 -0.92 1.95 
Model Indices 
M o d e l y2 190.85 149.77 220.11 
Significance <001 <001 <.001 
Overall Classification Rate 72.59 % 72.97 % 75.67 % 
No. of wholly-owned subsidiaries 216 270 232 
No. of joint ventures 222 189 219 
Number of cases 602 629 596 
rp<.10 
*p<.01 
** p< .001 
*** p< .0001 
Results of Hypothesis Tests 
1. Host country restrictiveness hypothesis 
The hypothesis regarding host country restrictiveness states that the extent of 
host county is positively associated with the probability for firms to choose a joint 
venture over a wholly-owned subsidiary. This hypothesis is preliminary supported since 
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all the four host-country-restrictiveness variables are in the predicted negative sign (a 
negative sign indicates a positive relationship between the host country restrictiveness 
variables and the choice of a joint venture mode). Specifically, there is an extremely 
strong evidence that the extent of infrastructure restrictiveness is positively related to 
the probability of firms to choose a joint venture mode (-.46, p < .0005). That is, the 
less restrictive the host country infrastructure, the more likely firms will choose 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. The inJ&astructure restrictiveness variable also attains one 
of the highest wald statistics, indicating that it has the greatest influence on foreign 
entry mode choice. In the full model, the extent of government restrictiveness also has 
a significant positive impact on the choice of a joint venture mode (-.25, p <10). The 
other two restrictiveness variables, ownership restrictiveness and ethnic restrictiveness, 
are found to have insignificant influence on foreign entry mode choice. In sum, 
Hypothesis 1 received moderate empirical support. Our overall evidence suggests that 
the less restrictive (in terms of infrastructure and government attitude towards business 
investment) the host country is, the less frequently firms would like to choose a joint 
venture mode over a wholly-owned subsidiary mode. 
2. Cultural distance hypothesis 
The result also suggests that cultural distance does not have a significant 
impact on foreign entry mode choice. However, the positive sign of the variable is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the more culturally distant between the host country 
and the parent home country, the more likely that firms will choose a joint venture 
mode over a wholly-owned subsidiary mode. 
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3. Historical norm hypothesis 
Historical norm hypothesis predicts that the more frequent a specific mode was 
chosen in a country in the past, the more likely that firms will choose the same specific 
entry mode in the future. Though the sign of the variable is consistent with the 
hypothesized direction, its impact on the foreign entry mode choice is not significant. 
4. Transaction cost factors hypothesis 
Generally, the transaction cost factors receive strong support in our empirical 
analysis. In total, eight of the thirteen transaction cost variables are confirmed to have 
a significant impact on the choice of foreign entry mode. First, as predicted, GDP 
growth is positively related to the choice of a joint venture mode (0.18, p <0005). 
Second, diversification predicts that firms with their foreign subsidiaries in an 
unrelated industry tend to prefer a joint venture mode over a wholly-owned subsidiary 
to those engaged in the core business (i.e. manufacturing). In our regression analysis, 
subsidiaries involving manufacturing are used as baseline cases (all dummy variables 
are equal to 0). The results suggest that five out of seven of the industry dummy 
variables have a significant impact on the choice of foreign entry mode. Among the five 
diversification variables, subsidiaries involving sales has the strongest impact on the 
dependent variable (wald = 14.82)，followed by finance, holding, research and 
development, and marketing/strategic planning. Nevertheless, contrasting to the 
predicted sign，all the seven industry dummy variables are found to have a negative 
relationship with the probability of choosing a joint venture mode. This indicates that 
firms investing in lines of business which are unrelated to their core business 
(manufacturing) tend to prefer wholly-owned subsidiaries to joint ventures. 
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As for the parent firm variables, the result shows that parent experience in the 
host country is not significantly related to the choice of entry mode. On the other hand, 
the parent asset specificity variables, R&D intensity and advertising intensity, receive 
significant support. Consistent with previous findings, greater R&D intensity is 
associated with the preference of a wholly-owned subsidiary over a joint venture. The 
parent advertising intensity is the strongest predictor of foreign entry mode choice with 
the highest wald statistics in the full model. But surprisingly, advertising intensity is 
found to be positively related to the probability of a joint venture mode, which is 
contradicted with our hypothesis. 
The variables, the relative size of the subsidiary to its parents and subsidiary 
age do not have a significant impact on the choice of foreign entry mode. 
Additional Findings 
1. Possible Moderating Effects 
In addition to the independent effects of transaction cost factors and 
institutional factors on the choice of foreign entry mode in Stage la and Stage lb, our 
hierarchical regression results additionally explored that the regression coefficients of 
some of the independent variables changed in direction and/or strength when both sets 
of transaction cost and institutional factors were incorporated together in the fiill 
model. Following the interpretation of hierarchical regression suggested by Lessard & 
Zaheer (1996), this may imply that some of the transaction cost factors may be 
moderated by the institutional factors，and some of the institutional factors may be 
moderated by the transaction cost factors. Altogether there are six independent 
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variables which may have moderated by either transaction cost factors or institutional 
factors. Each of these variables are described below. 
Parent experience In Model la, only transaction cost variables are included to 
examine their effects on the foreign entry mode choice. Parent experience in the host 
country is found to have a significant negative impact on the probability of choosing 
joint ventures (-.02, p <05). This result is consistent with previous literature which 
suggests that as parent firms accumulated local market knowledge, they feel less need 
to rely on local partners and would like to set up a wholly-owned subsidiary. However, 
when institutional factors are included together with the transaction cost variables in 
the foil model, not only does the relationship between parent experience and foreign 
entry mode choice become insignificant, but the direction of their relationship also 
changed from a negative sign to a positive sign. This may suggest that the impact of 
parent experience in the host country is moderated by institutional factors. 
Subsidiary age The result shows that both the strength and direction of the 
relationship between subsidiary age and the choice of a joint venture changed. In the 
transaction cost factor model, subsidiary age has a significant negative impact on the 
probability of a joint venture mode (-4.05, P =.0001). But in the full model, this 
relationship becomes insignificant, and the sign of the coefficient becomes positive. 
Similar to parent experience, this may suggest that the effects of subsidiary age may be 
moderated by the institutional factors. 
Government restrictiveness In Model lb in which only institutional variables are 
included to examine their effects on firms' probability of choosing a joint venture 
mode, government restrictiveness has an insignificant impact on the choice of foreign 
entry mode. However, when transaction cost variables are included in the foil mode, 
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the impact of government restrictiveness on the choice of entry mode (a JV in the 
study) becomes statistically significant (-.25, p <. 10). 
Ownership restrictiveness Another host country restrictiveness variable with its 
impact on the foreign entry mode choice moderated by transaction cost factors is 
ownership restrictiveness. In Model lb, as predicted, it is found that the less ownership 
restrictions imposed on the foreign parents by the local government, the more likely 
that firms will choose a wholly-owned subsidiary mode over a joint venture (-.62, p < 
.0001). However, this relationship becomes insignificant once transaction cost 
variables are entered into the model. 
Cultural distance Contradictory to our hypothesis, cultural distance is found to be 
negatively related to the choice of a joint venture mode when only institutional 
variables are entered. Surprisingly, when both institutional and transaction cost factors 
are examined together in the fiill model, the direction of the impact of cultural distance 
on entry mode choice changes to be positive. This latter result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the greater the cultural distance between the home country of the 
parents and the host country, the more frequently firms will choose a joint venture 
mode. 
Historical norm The last variable involves historical norm. Similar to those 
variables as government restrictiveness and ownership restrictiveness, the relationship 
between historical norm and foreign entry mode choice which is found significant in 
Model lb becomes insignificant in Model 2. This suggests that the effect of historical 
norm on the probability to choose joint ventures is moderated by the transaction cost 
factors. 
The present study just tries to examine whether moderating effects are present 
in the relationship between transaction cost factors and institutional factors on their 
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impact on foreign entry mode choice. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis 
suggest that while the relationship between some of the transaction cost factors (i.e. 
parent experience, and subsidiary age) and foreign entry mode choice may be 
moderated by the institutional factors, the relationship between some of the 
institutional factors (i.e. government restrictiveness, ownership restrictiveness, cultural 
distance, and historical norm) and mode choice is also moderated by the transaction 
cost factors. This study merely provides a preliminary support for the moderating 
effects between transaction cost factors and institutional factors on their impact on the 
choice of foreign entry mode. Further analysis should be conducted to examine which 
transaction cost (institutional) factor(s) actually moderate(s) the impact of institutional 
(transaction cost) factors on the foreign entry mode choice relationship. Table 5.4 
summarizes the results of each hypothesis, and the expected and actual signs of 
regression coefficient for each independent variable. 
2. Comparisons between Industries 
Additional to the present analysis, we also compare the regression results 
across the two industries, the home electronics industry and the automobile and parts 
industry. From Tables 5.5 and 5.6, we can see that the results of logistic regression 
analyses for the two industries do not differ significantly. The overall classification 
rates of the two industries are both fairly high. Most of the variables are found to have 
significant impact on foreign entry mode choice across the two industries, including 
GDP growth, diversification into sales, R&D, and holding, infrastructure 
restrictiveness, ownership restrictiveness, and historical norm. However, the variables 
of parent e邓erience, subsidiary age, and government restrictiveness are found to be 
significant only in the home electronic industry. Similarly, the variables of 
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diversification into finance, marketing and totally unrelated sectors are only significant 
in the automobile industry. Another interesting deviation is that totally unrelated 
TABLE 5.4 
A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES 
一 — — — — Predicted Actual Statistical Support for 
Hypothesis Variables sign sign significance hypothesis 
HI： The more restrictive the host country is, the more likely the MNEs will choose a JV 
mode over a WOS mode. 
Infrastructure restrictiveness - - ** Yes 
Government restrictiveness - - Yes 
Ownership restrictiveness - - n.s. No 
Ethnic restrictiveness - - n.s. No 
H2: The greater the cultural difference between the country of the MNE and the country of 
entry, the more likely that the MNEs will choose a JVmode over a WOS mode. 
Cultural distance + + n.s. No 
H3: The more times that an MNE chose a JV (WOS) mode of entry in a particular country, 
the more likely that the MNE will continue to choose a JV (WOS) over a WOS (JV) 
mode in the same host country in the future. 
Historical norm + + n.s. No 
H4: The lower the transaction costs associated with a JVmode, the more likely the MNEs 
will choose a JVmode than a WOS mode . 
GDP growth + + ** Y e s 
Diversification: 
Sales + - *** No 
Service + - n.s. No 
R&D + - * No 
Finance + - ** N o 
Holding/regional HQ + . * N o 
Marketing / strategic + • 卞 No 
planning 
Totally unrelated + - n.s. No 
Parent experience - + n s- No 
Parent R&D intensity * Yes 
Parent advertising intensity - + *** N o 
Subsidiary relative size - + n s No 
Subsidiary age - + n.s. No 
Additional Possible Moderating Effects: 
findings: 
Variables moderated Change in direction Change in magnitude 
Parent experience ——> + significant ->• insignificant 
Subsidiary age - -> + significant — insignificant 
Government restrictiveness insignificant — significant 
Ownership restrictiveness significant insignificant 
Cultural distance - + 
Historical norm significant -> insignificant 
t p < .10 * p< .001 ** p< .001 *** p< .0001 
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diversification, which is found to have a significant and negative impact on the choice 
of joint venture for the sample in the automobile industry and the ftill sample, has a 
positive (yet insignificant) sign for the sample in the home electronics industry. 
Likewise, government restrictiveness, which is found to have a negative sign for the 
sanq)le in the home electronics industry and the fiill sample, has a positive sign for the 
sample in the automobile industry. 
Overall, we find that the relationship between institutional factors and the 
choice of foreign entry mode is generally constant across industries. Yet, the 
relationship between transaction cost factors and foreign entry mode choice is 
relatively unstable between the two industries. When the sample of only one industry 
(either automobile and parts or home electronics) is used in the analyses, the impact of 
transaction cost related variables on foreign entry mode choice including parent R&D 
intensity, parent advertising intensity, and some diversification industry dummies 
(finance, holding, marketing/strategic planning in the home electronics industry; and 
sales, R&D, and marketing/strategic planing in the automobile industry) become 
insignificant. This finding, in part, suggests that the effects of these transaction cost 
variables on foreign entry mode choice are industry-specific. 
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TABLE 5.6 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
(HOME ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY) 
. Dependent Variable: WOS 二 0, JV = 1 
Model la Model lb Model 2 
Variables B Wald B Wald B Wald 
Transaction cost variables: 
1. GDP growth 0.23*** 34.56 0.19* 10.03 
2. Diversification 
2.1 Sales -1.12*** 16.06 -1.10** 13.65 
2.2 Service -0.42 0.51 -0.43 0.51 
2.3 R&D -2.451" 4.38 -2.501" 4.09 
2.4 Finance -7.06 0.42 -6.77 0.38 
2.5 Holding -2.21 卞 3.30 -1.87 1.82 
2.6 Marketing/strategic planning -1.711- 2.84 -1.71 2.00 
2.7 Totally unrelated 0.85 0.54 0.74 0.34 
3. Parent experience -0.031" 2.96 0.01 0.22 
4. Parent R&D intensity 0.08 0.08 -0.15 0.25 
5. Parent advertising intensity 0.07 0.00 1.55 0.29 
6. Subsidiary relative size 0.06 0.02 -0.81 1.25 
7. Subsidiary age -0.04* 5.38 -0.00 0.02 
Institutional variables: 
8. Infrastructure restrictiveness -0.76*** 42.08 -0.43* 8.17 
9. Government restrictiveness -0.13 0.98 -0.34卞 3.60 
10. Ownership restrictiveness -0.59*** 23.21 -0.14 0.84 
11. Ethnic restrictiveness -0.06 0.24 -0.01 0.00 
12. Cultural distance 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.44 
13. Historical norm 0.15* 8.23 0.05 0.43 
Constant ± 5 5 0.59 -0.51 2.04 -1.01 1.24 
Model Indices 
M o d e l X2 124.15 112.77 142.22 
Significance <001 <001 <001 
Overall Classification Rate 72.63 % 74.29 % 74.55 % 
No. of wholly-owned subsidiaries 157 192 159 
No. of joint ventures 127 120 131 
Number of cases 391 420 389 
t pc . lO * p< .01 **p<.001 ***p<.0001 
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TABLE 5.6 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
(AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY) 
Dependent Variable: WOS 二 0, JV = 1 
Model la Model lb Model 2 
Variables B Wald B Wald B Wald~ 
Transaction cost variables: 
1. GDP growth 0.27** 12.36 0.33卞 6.46 
2. Diversification 
2.1 Sales -0.95卞 5.23 -0.47 0.79 
2.2 Service -1.01 1.34 -0.39 0.16 
2.3 R&D -2.26* 6.67 -1.47 2.46 
2.4 Finance -3.89** 13.10 -3.25* 8.60 
2.5 Holding -3.53* 8.51 -3.18卞 6.32 
2.6 Marketing/strategic planning -2.271" 3.76 -1.92 2.29 
2.7 Totally unrelated -2.041" 5.88 -1-801" 3.02 
3. Parent experience -0.02 0.71 -0.01 0.06 
4. Parent R&D intensity -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.07 
5. Parent advertising intensity 0.02 0.00 -0.17 0.04 
6. Subsidiary relative size 0.26 0.94 0.48 2.72 
7. Subsidiary age -0.03 2.84 -0.00 0.01 
Institutional variables: 
8. Infrastructure restrictiveness -0.86*** 21.94 -0.531" 4.07 
9. Government restrictiveness 0.09 0.11 -0.28 0.53 
10. Ownership restrictiveness -0.87*** 15.43 -0.45 2.01 
11. Ethnic restrictiveness -0.27 2.40 -0.21 0.93 
12. Cultural distance 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.86 
13. Historical norm 0.28t 4.95 0.30 1.90 
Constant L01 0.86 0.24 0.27 -0.15 0.01 
Model Indices 
Model x2 76.57 54.27 92.72 
Significance <-001 <001 <001 
Overall Classification Rate 71.09 % 68.90 % 76.81 % 
No. of wholly-owned subsidiaries 55 70 13 
No. of joint ventures 95 74 86 
Number of cases 211 209 207 




The present study examines the effects of institutional factors (which have been 
ignored in existing literature) and the transaction cost factors (which have been 
extensively examines in previous studies) on foreign entry mode choice. Our results 
show that both institutional factors and transaction cost factors are important 
predictors of foreign entry mode choice. Both factors have high overall classification 
rates (72.59 % for the transaction cost factors and 72.97 % for the institutional 
factors) in our logistic regression model. 
Institutional Factors 
Institutional factors are found to be important predictors of firms' entry mode 
choice decisions. Especially, infrastructure support and local government attitude 
towards business development in the host country strongly influenced the choice of 
foreign entry mode. This suggests that economic and technological strength, and 
legal/political favorability, of the host country are major initial determinants for firms' 
decisions regarding the mode of foreign entry. 
The reason for this is obvious. The infrastructure of the host country is a kind 
of contextual restrictive factor in shaping firms' choice of foreign entry mode. It can 
also be regarded as one of the sanctioning mechanism imposed on foreign firms in the 
host country because the host government may allow only selective foreign firms to 
utilize these infrastructure. In addition, the level of infrastructure development 
indicates the stability and prosperity of a host country at present as well as in the 
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fiiture. For example, well-developed infrastructure may be an indicator of local 
government support towards foreign investment in the host country. Yet, again, 
foreign firms' access to the local infrastructure is subject to the permission from the 
host government. While firms will not enter a country with unfavorable infrastructure 
conditions, once they have decided to invest, these firms may prefer to form a joint 
venture with local firms in order to develop recognition and legitimacy in the host 
country for a relatively short term, and hence, obtain the permission from the local 
government with regard to the more favorable access to the local infrastructure. 
The general attitude ofhost government on business development is the most 
immediate factor in influencing firms' decision on foreign entry mode choice since this 
will determine how much autonomy the foreign firms have in the host country. From 
the institutional perspective, with lower regulative institutional pressures from the host 
country government, firms need not to give away their ownership to local partners in 
exchange for survival and legitimacy in the host country, hence, a wholly-owned mode 
is preferred to a joint venture. While the influence ofhost government restrictions on 
the choice of foreign entry mode has been studied extensively in the past, most studies 
have neglected the importance of infrastructure on this choice. Thus, future research 
should take this critical country-specific factor into account as well. 
It is also interesting to find that ethnic restrictiveness and cultural distance are 
not significant predictors of foreign entry mode choice. This result is contradicting to 
prior studies such as Kogut & Singh (1988) and Agarwal (1994). One reason for this 
contradicting result is probably that socio-cultural factors are less critical for the entry 
mode choice decisions themselves than the economic and legal conditions in a host 
country. The enthnocentricity ofhost country people and the difference between home 
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and host cultures may come into effect after the subsidiary actually begins operations 
and interaction between people from both partners starts. 
Another reason is that the impact of socio-cultural factors on the entry mode 
choice decisions may be moderated by the strategy that the foreign firm pursues in the 
host country. As Anand, Ainuddin and Makino (1997) suggested, when a 
multidomestic strategy is adopted, joint venture may be a more appropriate mode as 
the local partners can offer more local knowledge and devise strategies that are more 
customized to the local conditions. On the other hand, if a global strategic goal is 
pursued, the firm may be better to set up a wholly-owned subsidiary since consistency 
in strategic orientation between the parent and the subsidiary will be more important 
than local responsiveness. 
Third, an important moderator of the relationship between socio-cultural 
factors and foreign entry mode choice is parent firms' previous experience in the host 
country. Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996) found that firms reduced cultural barriers 
through learning, especially through previous experience in the same host country. 
Further, they suggest that the direct experience in a particular host country is a more 
effective means to reduce cultural barriers in the host country than the transfer of 
experience in other countries in similar cultural blocks or in the countries with cultures 
similar to home country. Moreover, firms may take a dynamic perspective. That is, 
firms are willing to invest in a culturally distant country in order to learn the host 
country conditions for the subsequent fiiture investments. So, socio-cultural factor may 
not have the direct impact on the choice of entry mode. It may depend upon parent 
firms' level of local experience. 
A final reason is that the impact of socio-cultural factors on the choice of a 
joint venture mode may vary depending upon the country-of-origin of the joint venture 
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partners. It is more likely for firms to choose to local firms as their joint venture 
partners than home country based or third-country based firms in a socio-culturally 
distant country. 
All these alternative arguments may in part explain the insignificance and the 
instability of the directions of the impact of cultural distance on entry mode choice. 
Hence, fixture studies should examine the impact of socio-cultural factors using 
different levels of analysis. 
In all, the results of this study suggest that regulative institutional pressures 
(host country restrictiveness) are stronger determinants for foreign entry mode choice 
decision than normative and cognitive institutional pressures (socio-cultural distance). 
Transaction Cost Factors 
Consistent with previous transaction cost literature, our results show that firms 
entering a rapidly growing local market (high GDP growth), and with relatively weak 
technical advantages (low R&D intensity) tend to choose joint ventures over wholly-
owned subsidiaries. A rapidly growing local market reflects both opportunities and 
threats in host country environment: on one hand, it indicates economic attractiveness 
of the local market; on the other hand, it indicates an increase of competitive intensity 
in the local market. For the latter reason, a joint venture becomes a preferred mode in a 
rapidly growing local market. R&D intensity of parent firms has two contrasting 
influences on the firms' ownership preference (Gomes-Casseres, 1989b). While firms 
aiming to e?q)loit their technological advantages may prefer a whole ownership, those 
which aim to acquire technology may prefer to form a joint venture with firms with 
more advanced technology. Since the Japanese sample in our study are leading firms in 
the consumer electronics and automobile industries in the world, it is reasonable to 
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assume that these firms tend to choose the former option, that is, to exploit their own 
proprietary knowledge and technical capabilities, and set up a wholly-owned 
subsidiary. 
However, some findings are not consistent with those of the previous studies. 
Our evidence shows that advertising rate is positively associated with the choice of 
joint ventures. One possible reason for this result is that firms aggressive in advertising 
and promotion in their home countries may need assistance from local firms which 
possess substantial knowledge about the local markets. This occurs because marketing 
expertise and goodwill of the parents are imperfectly transferred across boarders 
especially in countries which have major differences in culture, language, marketing 
customs, and distribution systems (Hennart, 1991). In such situation, foreign firms 
would e?q)lore, rather than exploit, their marketing expertise from the JV partners. 
The results regarding the impact of diversification on the choice of foreign 
entry mode choice are also inconsistent with those of the previous studies. While 
previous literature suggests that joint venture formation is more likely to be chosen 
when firms enter unrelated areas of business, our results suggest the opposite: 
investments in unrelated business are more likely through a wholly-owned subsidiary 
than through a joint venture than those investments in related business 
(manufacturing). This may arise for three reasons. First, the level of the resources 
committed to establish a manufacturing subsidiary is usually greater than that to 
establish a sales or marketing subsidiary. So, firms will have an incentive to form a 
joint venture when entering manufacturing sectors in order to disperse investment 
risks. Second, lines of business such as financing, marketing, and research and 
development can be transferred across borders with nearly zero marginal costs, and are 
more easily internalized through a wholly-owned subsidiary mode. Third, local 
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government, which wants to facilitate technology transfer and strengthen its bargaining 
power over foreign MNEs, might have a special requirement regarding local ownership 
participation for the MNEs which want to set up manufacturing subsidiaries in the host 
country. This is true particularly for both automobile and home electronics industries in 
which huge job opportunities for local employers are created, and the basis for 
exporting of domestically produced products is developed. 
Comparisons between Institutional Factors and Transaction Cost Factors 
The simultaneous incorporation of institutional factors and transaction cost 
factors in the present study provides several insightM findings for the future foreign 
entry mode choice studies. It is suggested that institutional paradigm explains 
organizational structures and processes in some organizational fields such as schools 
and non-profit organizations more effectively than in business firms (Westney, 1993). 
Building on the traditional institutional literature, this study provides an example of the 
application of institutional theory in explaining the choice of foreign entry mode. Our 
evidence shows that transaction cost theory, which has been by far the dominant and 
effective economic paradigm in the stream of foreign entry mode choice research, is 
found to be insufficient to Qxplam the foreign entry mode choice but should be 
supplemented with the institutional factors. 
More interestingly, the present study preliminarily explored that institutional 
factors and transaction cost factors may be inter-moderated with each other, which 
provides insights for future research. While sociology can be regarded as a perspective 
of environmental determinism, stating how firm's freedom of action is limited by the 
social environment; economics tends to adopt a perspective of environmental 
voluntarism, enq)liasizing the free choices that firms can make to maxiniize their utility. 
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So, the final equity structure of the foreign subsidiary may depend on which position it 
is located on the continuum of environmental determinism and voluntarianism. To 
investigate this conceptual issue in more details, fixture research should explore the 
moderating effects of transaction cost factors (institutional factors) on the relationship 
between institutional factors (transaction cost factors) and foreign entry mode choice 
on a one-by-one-variable basis. 
It has been argued that transaction cost theory can just explain what ownership 
structure a firm wants, but not what ownership structure a firm can get under 
regulatory environments (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). Gomes-Casseres (1990) found that 
the relationship between transaction cost factors and the choice of foreign entry mode 
is moderated by host country government restrictions. On the other hand, many 
scholars have argued that the institutional structure of society could either raise or 
lower the transaction costs (North, 1990; Parkhe, 1993 ； Shan & Hamilton, 1994). 
Agarwal (1994) found that the relationship of socio-cultural distance and the choice of 
joint venture was moderated by the multinationality of the parent firms. 
On this basis, we propose that the institutional choice-constraining factors and 
the transaction cost choice-promoting factors will interact with each other and 
subsequently determine the choice of foreign entry mode. And our results shows that 
several institutional factors including government restrictiveness, ownership 
restrictiveness, cultural distance, and historical norm may be moderated by the 
transaction cost factors. 
Given transaction cost factors, government restrictiveness has insignificant 
influence on the choice of foreign entry mode. However, it becomes significant when 
transaction cost factors are taken into account. Probably, as suggested by Gomes-
Casseres (1990), this is because government restrictiveness moderates the effects of 
87 
transaction cost factors on the choice of entry mode. For instance, in a country where 
the host government hinders local business activities, joint venture formation is not 
chosen by, but is forced to, irrespective of whether the parent firms possess strong 
competitive advantages exploitable in the host country. On the contrary, firms may 
form a wholly-owned subsidiary in less restrictive countries even when they do not 
have such exploitable competitive advantages, simply because they prefer to secure fiill 
control over the venture. Therefore, host government attitude towards business 
development and transaction cost factors should be both taken into account to explain 
the choice of foreign entry mode. 
Besides, our findings suggest that ownership restrictiveness has significant 
influence only when transaction cost factors are held constant. According to Gomes-
Casseres (1990), the level of ownership of foreign subsidiaries is determined by the 
bargaining process between foreign firms and local governments. That is, firms with 
strong firm-specific competitive advantages may have stronger bargaining power over 
local governments, and hence, secure a fiill- or dominant equity ownership. 
Another possible moderating effect found in our study is associated with 
cultural distance. Our finding shows that there is a negative relationship between 
cultural distance and the choice of joint ventures when only institutional factors are 
considered. A possible reason for those finding can be explained from the management 
complexity perspective. This perspective suggests that the greater the cultural distance 
between the home and host countries, the greater the potential for management 
complexity between joint venture partners and hence the higher coordination costs. 
Thus, the management complexity perspective suggests that it is rather difficult to form 
a joint venture with culturally distant partners. However, our evidence suggests that 
the relationship between cultural distance and the choice of joint ventures becomes 
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positive when both institutional and transaction cost factors are examined together. 
This may occur due to the possibility that the relationship between cultural distance 
and the choice of foreign entry mode is moderated by transaction cost factors. For 
instance, firms with no host country experience may prefer to joint venture with local 
partners so as to speed up its local knowledge accumulation. Agarwal (1993) did find 
that multinationality was an important moderator in the relationship between greater 
socio-cultural distance and the choice of a joint venture. Thus, whether cultural 
distance has a direct impact on the choice of a joint venture mode remains unknown. 
Our study provides the evidence that the direction of the relationship between cultural 
distance and foreign entry mode choice may be moderated by transaction cost factors. 
Future research should specify such a moderating relationship. 
The results of the study also suggest that the choice of foreign entry mode is 
significantly influenced by a firm's historical pattern of foreign entry. However, when 
transaction cost factors such as host country experience, know-how (R&D intensity), 
goodwill (advertising intensity) are entered in the regression equation, the impact of 
the firm's historical pattern on the choice of entry mode becomes insignificant. This 
result iirqjlies that firms would choose the desirable entry mode primarily to minimize 
the transaction costs and secondary to follow historical pattern of foreign entry. Such a 
result is very insightM as it demonstrates that two separate motives for foreign entry 
mode choice, consistency with historical norm and achievement of organizational 
efficiency, are not mutually exclusive but are in fact complementary. 
Besides the possible moderating effects on the relationship between some of 
the institutional factors and foreign entry mode choice by the transaction cost factors, 
two transaction cost factors are found to be possibly moderated by the institutional 
factors: parent's host country experience and subsidiary age. The result suggests that 
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the significant relationships between both of these variables and the choice of a joint 
venture mode become insignificant and positive when institutional factors are entered 
in the regression model. In fact, two variables, parent experience and subsidiary age, 
are similar in that they both indicate the extent of the local knowledge accumulation. 
The greater host country experience the parent has and the older the subsidiary, the 
more local knowledge will be accumulated. Therefore, it is expected that firms with 
more local knowledge will feel less need from the local partners and prefer whole 
ownership. At the same time, firms may be expected to conform to the ownership 
demands of local governments of familiar countries more often than to those of 
governments of less familiar countries (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). This is because the 
maintenance of good working relationships with local partners may lower the 
importance of monitoring of the partners, even in the 'forced" joint ventures. Also, 
firms may continue to form joint ventures with local partners so as to maintain their 
legitimacy and recognition in the liost country. Hence, it is not surprising to find that 
greater familiarity with the host country will lead to the choice of more joint ventures. 
Moreover, our additional findings on the two separate industries show that 
while the impact of institutional factors remains consistent and stable across industries, 
the effects of some of the transaction cost factors on the choice of foreign entry mode 
are rather unstable and industry-specific. Specifically, the impact of parent asset 
specificity proxied by the R&D intensity and advertising intensity of the parents 
becomes insignificant once industry effects are held constant. There are two plausible 
explanations for this. 
First, the relatively unstable impact of these transaction cost variables on the 
choice of foreign entry mode may be because our measures of R&D intensity and 
advertising intensity cannot folly operationalize the asset specificity of investment. For 
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example, high advertising expenditures of a particular industry in the home country 
may not necessarily mean that the same advertising intensive strategy and marketing 
skills can be successfiilly transferred to other host countries because of different 
marketing systems and/or language and cultural barriers. Similarly, R&D expenditures 
may not be an adequate proxy for the tacit know-how of the parents. Especially for the 
Japanese automobile industry, the main advantages that the Japanese parents originate 
are production expertise, production engineering, and quality control. And Japanese 
parents possess these advantages will prefer to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries to 
guarantee the quality of products manufactured (Dunning, 1986). But all these 
proprietary advantages may not be proxied by the R&D expenditures alone. Thus, 
improvements in the use of proxy variables should be made in fixture studies. 
Second, the motives of the Japanese parents may be another reason for the 
instability of the impact of R&D intensity and advertising intensity on foreign entry 
mode choice. The direction and strength of the influence of R&D intensity and 
advertising intensity on the choice of foreign entry mode may depend on whether firms 
aim to exploit or acquire proprietary knowledge. If the primary purpose of the firms' 
investment is to exploit their proprietary knowledge, they may prefer a wholly-owned 
subsidiary to a joint venture. In contrast, if the main purpose of their investment is to 
acquire proprietary knowledge from local partners, then, they may prefer a joint 
venture to a wholly-owned subsidiary. The mixed motives may be more equally 
balanced in the Japanese home electronics and automobile industries. This suggests 
that the strategic motives behind the parents is another important predictor in the 
choice of foreign entry mode. This may be one of the agenda for fiiture entry mode 
choice research. 
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In summary, the present study provides preliminary evidence that there are 
inter-moderating effects between institutional factors and transaction cost factors. It is 
found that the relationship between some institutional factors and foreign entry mode 
choice is moderated by transaction cost factors, the effects of some transaction cost 
factors on the choice of entry mode are institutionally bounded, and the impact of 
parent firm's asset specificity on entry mode choice varies across industries. All these 
indicate that the impacts of transaction cost factors and institutional factors on foreign 
entry mode choice are not mutually independent. It is both theoretically and practically 
contributory for future research to specify the domain of the effect of each factor on 
the choice of foreign entry mode. 
Synthesizing Institutional Factors and Transaction Cost Factors 
The present study suggests that both institutional factors and transaction cost 
factors are effective predictors of foreign entry mode choice. However, it is also 
explored that when institutional factors and transaction cost factors are taken together, 
moderating effects may occur. This implies that both institutional factors and 
transaction cost factors are not mutually exclusive but are complementary. This section 
tries to propose how the two factors can be bridged together. 
Traditionally, it seems that there is a deep gulf between the intellectual fields of 
sociology and economics. While sociology can be regarded as a perspective of 
environmental determinism, suggesting that firm's freedom of action is constrained by 
the social environment; economics tends to utilize a perspective of environmental 
voluntarism, emphasizing the free choices that firms can make to maximize their utility, 
and treating social environment as given. Though the two paradigms seem to be 
competing with each other, they can be bridged together as they indicate the same 
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continuum of the degree of freedom of choices to the firms. For example, institutional 
theory, which originates from sociology, leans to environmental determinism, 
suggesting that as default, a firm's actions are constrained by external environmental 
forces. Even within the domain of these external environmental forces, there is a sub-
continuum ranging from more deterministic coercive or regulative forces to more 
voluntaristic mimetic or normative institutional forces. On the other hand, transaction 
cost theory, which originates from modern economics, emphasizes environmental 
voluntarism, suggesting that as default, a firm's actions are independent of external 
environmental forces. Both theoretical perspectives focused on each extreme of this 
continuum. The structure of an organization depends on which position it is located on 
the continuum of environmental determinism and voluntarianism. 
In fact, foreign entry mode choice is a good research arena for the synthesis of 
the institutional paradigm and the transaction cost theory as it presents exactly a 
freedom of choice to the MNEs. Our results confirm that institutional factors and 
transaction cost factors cannot fiiUy explain why firms choose a particular mode of 
entry independently. Hence, the two perspectives are complementary, rather than 
competing, with each other. 
In order to explain under what conditions institutional factors (transaction cost 
factors) become stronger determinants of the foreign entry mode choice than 
transaction cost factors (institutional factors), fixture study should take organizational 
learning perspective into account in the FDI decisions. Presumably, institutional factors 
will be more important determinants for the entry mode choice when firms invest in a 
new country. This is because striving for legitimacy and survival is the most immediate 
goal of the MNE investing in a new country. But once the MNE accumulates its social 
capital and local knowledge in the host country, the MNE will then strive for 
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efficiency. Moreover, the MNE can de-institutionalize the local isomorphic pressures 
by transferring management practices adopted in its home country and reinforcing local 
firms to follow the transferred management practices. An example is the Japanese 
automobile transplants of Toyota, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Honda, and Mazda in the US. 
These Japanese automobile firms tried to set up a "good citizen" image by making 
contributions to local charities so as to gain legitimacy in the US host country. Then 
they located their plants in areas where the institutionalization effects of the US auto 
industry patterns is relatively weak or non-existent, and undertook their continuous 
reinforcement of their Japanese management model through exhortation and ongoing 
training (Westney, 1993). 
In conclusion, whether institutional factors or transaction cost factors are the 
predominating factors on the choice of foreign entry mode may be contingent upon the 
amount of knowledge and e?q)erience the MNEs accumulate in the host country. 
Organizational learning as a contingent factor for institutional and transaction cost 
forces is evidenced in our study since half of the moderating effects are occurring on 
the organizational learning related variables, including historical norm, parent host 
country experience, and subsidiary age. Further investigation of this contingency 
relationship is very contributory to bridging the gap between institutional perspective 




The present study sheds new lights on the research arena of foreign entry mode 
choice in three ways. First, theoretically, this study is the first that incorporates the 
institutional perspective as a theoretical basis in foreign entry mode choice research. 
The results of our analyses generally support the use of institutional rationale and 
transaction cost argument in explaining foreign entry mode choice decisions. The 
results also suggest that there are possible moderating effects between the institutional 
factors and transaction cost factors. The results of our study add new insights to 
existing literature. 1) For the institutional literature, our evidence suggests that 
regulative institutional forces are more powerful than normative, cognitive, and 
historical institutional forces in shaping organizational structures and behavior. 2) For 
the transaction cost theory literature, it is suggested that transaction cost factors are 
rather unstable across countries and industries. 3) For the foreign entry mode choice 
literature, it suggests that MNE's foreign entry mode choice decision cannot be 
explained by a single theoretical perspective but has to adopt a pluralistic view such as 
the combination of institutional perspective and transaction cost economics as in the 
present study. 
Second, with regard to research methodology, the sample used in the present 
study is the largest among those used in the existing studies of foreign entry mode 
choice. The present study explores the widest scope of country-specific institutional 
factors through exploratory factor analysis. Moreover, the current study adopted the 
most sophisticated and updated databases of country-specific, industry-specific, parent 
firm-specific and subsidiary-specific variables. The richness of information provided by 
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the present database alone may provide significant contribution to the research of 
foreign entry mode choice. 
The present study offers one practical implication to MNEs' managers. This 
study reminds MNEs' decision makers that the choice of foreign entry mode is not 
merely the choice of the ownership structure (i.e. joint ventures or wholly-owned 
subsidiaries); instead, it involves the choice of the degree of efficiency and legitimacy 
that the MNEs should get from the investment. The MNEs' managers should be aware 
that striving for pure efficiency may not be the appropriate FDI strategy in some 
countries while striving for pure legitimacy may not be really beneficial in other 
countries. We propose that to what extent an MNE should conform to the host 
country environment and to what extent it should comply with its own efficiency 
strategy will be contingent on the repository of knowledge and experience it possesses. 
The present study is not without limitations. The first limitation is the relatively 
narrow scope of the study. The domain of tlie study can be expanded in at least three 
ways. First, as mentioned earlier, there are different perspectives within the domain of 
institutional theory. This study focuses specifically on the institutional pulls between 
the host country environment and the multinational enterprises. Future studies should 
investigate the inter-organizational isomorphic pulls. For example, one question to be 
investigated in fixture studies is whether late entrants tend to adopt the foreign entry 
mode which has already been adopted by earlier entrants and how inter- organizational 
isomorphism influences performance of new entry. 
The second way to broaden the domain of the study is to improve the 
characteristics of the sample. The current study focused on ten largest Japanese home 
electronics and automobile companies. Thus, the scope of the study can be extended to 
other contexts in terms of the country-of-origins of the parent firms (non-Japanese 
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parents), industries in which the parent firms operate (non-manufacturing sectors and 
other manufacturing sectors other than home electronics and automobile), the size of 
the parents (small- to medium-sized companies), and other modes of foreign entry 
(acquisition and capital participation). 
Another area to extend the scope of the study is the performance consequences 
of foreign entry mode choice. Just investigating how transaction cost factors and 
institutional factors affect the choice of foreign entry mode is not of very great value, 
because the final choice is meaningM only when it is proven to attain successful 
subsidiary performance . 
The second limitation of the present study involves the measurement used in 
the study. First, as mentioned earlier, the R&D intensity and advertising intensity may 
not be sufficient proxies for the parent firms' intermediate goods such as technological 
know-how and goodwill. Second, the use of Hofstede's (1980, 1991) cultural value 
indices in the measurement of cultural distance also suffers from criticisms. Some may 
query whether the validity of the indexes still holds after about thirty years. Another 
weakness is the China's scores on the cultural indices as they are just estimations 
without empirical confirmation. Others may even argue that cultural distance 
represents not solely the differences in national cultures but also corporate cultures. 
Differences in national cultures may not matter when the parent firm has a very strong 
corporate culture which is to be transcended to its foreign subsidiaries. Third, the 
measurement of historical norms is rather crude because it is just a frequency count of 
previous investments in the host country. In fact, historical norm should be measured, 
8 A preliminary test of the relationship between foreign entry mode choice (in our case, the mode of 
joint venture or wholly-owned subsidiary) and subsidiary performance was conducted and the results 
confirmed that subsidiary performance did significantly differ across the modes of entry. Details of the 
results are decribed in Appendix 4. 
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incorporating both the firm's own developmental sequence and the larger societal 
historical frame. Thus, the measurement of all these constructs should be improved in 
future research. Though it is rather tough, it is worth doing since a breakthrough made 
in the measurement of these constructs surely contributes to shaping the sophistication 
of all the related research. 
A final concern is the cross-sectional research design and the use of secondary 
data. Using cross-sectional data neglects the longitudinal trend of the firms' choice of 
foreign entry mode. In order to establish or strengthen a causal link between the 
variables, longitudinal design should be conducted in fixture research. As is indicated in 
the study, some of the results in our analyses may be contingent upon the strategic 
orientation and responses of the firms. However, the details of the firms' strategies 
cannot be sufficiently explained from secondary data sources alone. Hence, primary 
data can help provide a more fiill picture and the rationale behind the scene. 
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A REVIEW OF THE USE OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN 
FOREIGN ENTRY MODE CHOICE RESEARCH: 
CONCEPTUAL STUDIES 
~Studies~""“Country- T h e o r y ~ Country- Synopsis of results 
specific base specific 
variables variables used 
used as 
Anderson &"“Independent Transaction External Proposed that the greater the 
Gatignon, variables cost theory uncertainty: country risks, the higher the 
1988 - country risk appropriate degree of control. 
Internal When socio-cultural distance is 
uncertainty: great, either low-control mode or 
-socio-cultural high-control mode is more 
distance efficient than intermediate levels. 
-foreign The larger the foreign business 
business community in the host country, 
community size the lower the level of control. 
Contractor Independent Combining General Hypothesized that both the real 
1990 variables internalizat- investment and interest rates and political risks 
ion, risk conditions: will not have effects on either the 
transaction - real interest costs or benefits side of 
cost, and rates international investments and 
corporate - political risk thus the modal choice, 
strategy 
perspectives 
Hill, HwangIndependen tEc lec t i c Environmental Proposed that high country risk 
& Kim, variables theory variables: and low location familiarity will 
1990 - Country favor low resource commitments, 
risks i.e. licensing. 
-Location 
familiarity 
Minor, W u ~ Independent - Environmental Proposed that the proportion of 
& Ghoi， variables attractiveness: entrants using high control entry 
1991 - economic modes in a less attractive country 
environment will be greater among firms 
-legal/political pursuing the strategic objectives 
favorability of long-term effectiveness and 
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A REVIEW OF THE USE OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN 
FOREIGN ENTRY MODE CHOICE RESEARCH: 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
I Studies Country- Theory ~ C o u n t r y - ~ Measures Synopsis of results 
specific base specific 
variables variables used 
I used as 
Kogut & Independent - - cultural Built a cultural Cultural distance tended to 
Singh variables distance distance index based increase the probability of 
1 9 8 8 ， - uncertainty on Hofstede's (1980) choosing joint venture. 
avoidance cultural value indexes The more uncertainty 
avoiding a culture is, the 
more likely a firm to 
choose JV and WOS than 
acquisition. 
Contractor Independent - - government 1982 Benchmark Government-imposed | 
1990 variables regulation Surveys of the U.S. limits, GDP, performance ! 
- performance Commerce requirements significantly 
requirements Department influenced firms to form 
imposed on JV. The higher the share 
I investors of a nation in total global 
_ commercial U.S. investments, the 
and political lower the propensity to 
1 risks form JV. But no firm 
I r GDP evidence that country risks 
-foreign influenced the tendency to 




I nation to U.S. 
I . investors 
Gomes- IndependentA synthesis~ ~- host Devising a method Firms facing restrictive 
Casseres, and control of government using a dummy governments had to forego 
1990 ‘ variables transaction restrictions variable to distinguish what the firm wants. GDP 
j cost and - GDP growth restrictive and open growth itself did not have 
I bargaining of host countries, using data significant effects on mode 
j models country from the Harvard choice, but it seemed to 
Multinational encourage JV in restrictive 
Enterprises Project countries. 
Agarwal Independent Ownership, - market Managerial perception Firms preferred WOS in 
& variables location, potential through questionnaire high potential markets. 
Ramaswa- and - investment survey (n=285) Firms did not show 
mi, 1992 internalizat risks preference for any specific 
I -ion entry mode in markets that 
I paradigm have high investment 
I risks. 
Kim& Independent Global Environmental Questionnaire survey High host country risks or 
Hwang, variables strategic variables: (n=96) location familiarity tended 
1992 perspective - Country to avoid WOS or JV in 
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I Studies Country- Theory~ Country- Measures Synopsis of results 
specific base specific 
variables variables used 
I used as 
ErramilliModerating""”Transaction - Cultural - Hofstede's (1980) Cultural distance did not 
& Rao, variables cost theory distance cultural indexes and have any effects on entry 
1993 - Country risks Kogut & Singh's mode choice. Service firms 
(1988) method tended to favor shared-
[ -Goodnow & Hansz's control mode with 
(1972) country risk increasing country risk. 
I classification 
Agarwal, Independent - - Socio- - Hofstede's (1980) Neither country risks nor 
1994 ， variable and cultural cultural indexes and market potential moderated 
I moderators distance Kogut & Singh's the impact of socio-cultural 
-Country risks (1988) method distance on the choice of 
-Market - International joint venture mode, 
potential Country Risk Guide 
I ( 1 9 8 5 - 8 9 ) 
j - GNP per capita 
Shane, Independent - - cultural - Hofstede's (1980) Licensing was preferred in 
1994， and control differences in power distance scale countries in which trust is 
j variables trust and the Chinese higher. 
I - host Culture Connection's 
I government integration index 
j restrictions - 1982 Benchmark 





Brouthers,IndependentMiller 's - control risk~~ Questionnaire survey Control risks were found to 
1995 ， variables (1992) - market (n=125) be moderately related and 
internation complexity market complexity 
j aj risk significantly related to entry 
I model mode strategy. Firms 
j perceiving greater 
j international risks pursued 
1 more independent entry 
\ modes. 
Barkema, IndependentOrganizat-~~- Cultural - Ronen & Shenkar's The impact of cultural 
Bell & variables ional blocks (1985) clusters of distance varied by mode 
Pennings, learning - Cultural cultural blocks (startups or acquisitions) 
1996 ， perspective distance - Hofstede's (1980) and ownership structure 
cultural indexes, (WOS or JV). Barriers were 
using Ronen & found to be more 
j Shenkar's (1985), pronounced when the 
1 and Kogut & Singh's venture required 'double 
I (1988) methods layered acculturation'. 
101 
APPENDIX 1 - B (Cont，） 
^ ‘ • . ^ ^ ― — ^ ― — — 
I Studies Country- ~ T h e o r y C o u n t r y - M e a s u r e s Synopsis of results 
specific base specific 
variables variables used 
I used as 
Erramil l i , Independent " Nationality - Hofstede's (1980) The propensity to 
1996 ' and control effects: cultural indexes and establish majority-owned 
variables - power Kogut & Singh's subsidiaries increased as 
distance (1988) method the power distance and 
-uncertainty - Market size measured uncertainty avoidance 
avoidance by the total annual characterizing the home 
j - market size of advertising country increased, and as 
home and host expenditures of the the home country market 
countries country size increased. 
-cultural - 1982 Benchmark 
distance Surveys of the 




Delios, Independent~~Transaction- socio-culture - Hofstede's (1980) Host country risks and 
Makino & variables cost theory distance cultural indexes and local ownership 
Beamish, - country risks Kogut & Singh's restrictions influenced 
1 9 9 6 , - host country (1988) method firms to adopt a shared 
I ownership - Euromoney's (1991) ownership structure, 
restrictions country risk rating whereas cultural distance 
j measures made firms to choose a 
I - 1982 Benchmark fiill ownership structure, 
j Survey by the U.S. 
I Department of 
I Commerce 
Padmana- Independent Transaction -host - data sourced from Host country 
bhan & variables cost theory government Business International, restrictiveness had a 
Cho，1996 ownership PriceWaterhouse， negative influence on the 
’ restrictions United Nations Center choice of a WOS while 
j - cultural on Transnational cultural distance had a 
j distance Corporations, and U.S. positive one. 
j Department of 
j Commerce 
-Hofstede's (1980) 
I cultural indexes and 
j Kogut & Singh's 
(1988) method 
Pan, 1996~ Independent Dunning's - country risks - Institutional Investor In China, favorability of 
， variables eclectic of China (Cosset & Roy, 1991) country risks led to an 
j paradigm; - cultural risks - Hofstede's (1980) increase of foreign equity 
I and cultural indexes and share up to 50% but not 
I bargaining Kogut & Singh's beyond that. Foreign 
I power (1988) method partner was more likely to 
j perspective acquire an equal or a 
majority equity instead of 
a minority one as cultural 
I distance increased. 
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HOFSTEDE'S CULTURAL VALUE INDICES FOR CHINA 
G E E R 丁 H O F S T E D E 
f a x 00852-2603-6840 
Ms Daphne Yiu Wing-yee 
D e p a r t m e n t o f M a n a g e m e n t 
Chinese U n i v e r s i t y of Hong Kong 
Shat in NT, Hong Kong 
V e l p , t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , 8 A p r i l 1997 
Dear Ms Yiu, 
Thank you f o r your f a x of 4 A p r i l . Thsre have 
been s e v e r a l s t u d i e s i n China c o l l e c t i n g s c o r e s on t h e f i r s t 
f o u r d i m e n s i o n s , b u t none of them i s w e l l enough matched w i t h 
t h e (IBM) p o p u l a t i o n i n my o r i g i n a l s t u d i e s t o c o n s i d e r i t 
' t h e ' r e p l i c a t i o n . 
On t h e b a s i s of what 工 have s e e n , my e s t i m a t e f o r s c o r e s f o r 
China matched t o "the s c o r e s i n ray books f o r o t h e r c o u n t r i e s 
i s : PDI 90 , UAI 40 , IDV 20, and MAS 66 ( t h e l a t t e r i s based on 
a more p r e c i s e c a l c u l a t i o n i n my a r t i c l e : "Gender S t e r e o t y p e s 
and P a r t n e r P r e f e r e n c e s of Asian Women in Mascul ine and 
Feminine Cul tures" , i n t h s ‘丁。urnal r - ro s s -Cu l tura l 
p s y c h o l o g y r V o l . 2 7 n o . 5 , 1996, 5 3 3 - 5 4 6 ) . 
Good luck w i t h your M.Phil t h e s i s ; and 工 am i n t e r e s t e d i n 
s e e i n g y o u r r e s u l t s I 
Yours s i n c e r e l y , 
' I ^ ^ - ^ C ^ e r t H o f s t e d e 
" ^ P r o f e s s o r Emeritus 
DEN BRUYL 1 5 N L - 6 8 8 1 AN VELP 
TEL + 3 1 - 2 6 - 3 6 4 - 2 6 4 8 ; FAX + 3 1 - 2 6 - 3 6 1 - 1 0 2 1 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ANOVA RESULTS OF FOREIGN ENTRY MODE CHOICE 
AND SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE 
We tried to examine whether subsidiary performance differs by both entry 
mode and country regions by conducting an ANOVA test. Subsidiary performance is 
measured from the parent firm's perspective and is based on a survey that asked the 
top Japanese manager of the subsidiary to evaluate the overall financial performance, 
using a three-point scale with 1 indicating financial loss, 2 breakeven, and 3 profitable. 
The source of subsidiary performance information is obtained from Kaigai Shinshutsu 
Kigyo Soran (Toyo Keizai, 1996). Entry mode is either wholly-owned subsidiary or 
joint ventures. Three country regions are chosen, including Asia (East and Southeast 
Asia), Europe (Western Europe), and North America (USA and Canada). Because of 
the reluctance of the Japanese managers to release performance information, the 
san^)le contains only 85 cases and the results should be interpreted with cautions. The 
ANOVA results show that subsidiary performance significantly differs across the 
modes of entry (F=2.25, p<.10) but not across country regions. Wholly-owned 
subsidiaries are found to have better performance than joint ventures. This result is also 
supported by the non-parametric analysis. The Kruskal-Wallis One Way ANOVA 
confirms that subsidiary performance significantly differed between WOS and JV (x2 = 
8.9158, p = .002); and no significant difference is found across regions (%2 = 0.7419; p 
=.690). However, the results here are based on the assumption that there is a 
sequential relationship among entry determinants, foreign entry mode choice, and 
subsidiary performance. Future efforts should be made to examine whether foreign 
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